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### Norms of Warfare

#### Drones destroy the norms of warfare

Paul Kahn 2011 "Imagining Warfare" http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/24/1/199.abstract Paul W. Kahn is the Robert W. Winner Professor of Law and the Humanities at Yale Law School and the Director of the Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights. Got his Ph.D. in Philosophy at Yale and a B.A. at U Chicago

Today, however, we are in an uncertain time. The old pattern of war between sovereign states is breaking apart in the face of new threats. The different elements no longer exist in relationships of mutual support. The balance among the technology of violence, the politics of war, and our normative understanding of the character of the practice no longer holds. Political violence is no longer between states with roughly symmetrical capacities to injure each other; violence no longer occurs on a battlefield between masses of faceless combatants; and those involved no longer seem morally innocent. The drone is both a symbol and a part of the dynamic destruction of what had been a stable imaginative structure. It captures all of these changes: the enemy is not a state, the target is not innocent, the engagement occurs in a normalized time and space, and there is no reciprocity of risk.

#### We'll isolate three internal links

#### First is the subjectivity of the combatant

#### In times of war the combatant's identity is intrinsically tied to the corporate body they're fighting for - drone assassinations, in contrast, classify the target as an individual enemy of the state

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Complementing the spatial and temporal aesthetic of war is an idea of the subject. Who is it that can kill and be killed outside of the ordinary norms of law? International humanitarian law speaks of the combatant’s privilege, as if it were a matter of extending certain rights to an individual who meets a list of formal qualifications.55 This gives us only a negative view of what is at stake: the combatant’s privilege protects the individual from legal prosecution for the injury he causes. The celebration of the combatant is not, however, grounded in his legal immunities. Rather immunity is a formal reflection of a positive quality: the combatant has about him something of the quality of the sacred. His acts are not entirely his own. They generate awe and respect incommensurate with law. The combatant is not individually responsible for his actions because those acts are no more his than ours. Legally, we construct this as a matter of agency and hierarchy of command. The combatant’s role is generally to follow orders.56 For this reason, responsibility lies at the top of a chain of command. Classically, the chain was followed all the way to the point at which legal responsibility ends: the head of state who spoke in the sovereign voice. The legal mind railed against the paradox that came from linking the superior orders defense to head of state immunity. The paradox, however, was well founded for just as the combatant’s acts cannot be grasped as his alone, the actions of the head of state are not his alone. Behind the paradox is an intuition that warfare is a conflict between corporate subjects, inaccessible to ordinary ideas of individual responsibility whether of soldier or commander. The citizen combatant acts not just under the legal authority of the state or as a representative of the state. This could be equally true of mercenary. It fails to capture the citizen’s political identity. We need, in addition, to recognize here a corporate form of personhood. At war, states confront each other as historical actors. They are the victors and losers; their history is being written. Warfare is the suffering of the sovereign body. The relationship here is not that of means to end, nor of part to whole, but of microcosm to macrocosm. The individual is not just a representation of the whole, but instantiates the whole. Here, we see the nation as a single corporate subject. This does not make an individual’s death less tragic or killing less horrendous. That, however, is not where its political meaning lies. The citizen-combatant’s death is always a sacrifice. Dying for the state is not a negation, but an affirmation. To return to theological language, it is “life through death” – the life of the nation.

#### This unique instance of disassociation establishes competing forms of combatant subjectivity that break down our ability to predict, and historically assess lethal acts of violence

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Corporate identity has informed both sides of modern war. The enemy is not killed as an individual. He remains the enemy even if he has done nothing wrong – indeed, even if he disagrees with the policies of his government. Friends can become enemies because the category has nothing to do with personal subjectivity. The enemy is always faceless because we don’t care about his personal history any more than we care about his hopes for the future. Once there is a return to the normal, one-time enemies can come to see each other as uniquely bound to each other; they have shared an extraordinary experience. We see this today in the gatherings of veterans from both sides of the Second World War. Nothing need be forgiven, for despite the killing and destruction no one did anything wrong. In some deep sense, no one did anything at all. The corporate character of the popular sovereign stands opposed to the individualism of the rule of law upon which so much of our liberalism is based. Neither is it adequately captured by speaking of the “status” of the combatant. Status is a way of distinguishing combatants from noncombatants, not a way of capturing the nature of political identity at stake in the life and death of the state. The popular sovereign is the direct successor to the mystical corpus of the sacral monarch. The metaphysics here is Christological – the mystical body of the Church – but the phenomenon has broader roots.57 The erotic character of the political community is expressed in this notion of corporate identity.58 In and through the popular sovereign, we are one with those who came before and those who will come after. Corporate identity lies behind the intergenerational sense of responsibility that informs much of our political ethos: the nation is responsible for its past wrongs just as it responsible to those not yet living. Contemporary theorists are likely to dismiss the idea of the corporate subject as merely psychological – a matter of emotion rather than reason. That dismissal, however, no less indulges a metaphysical assumption: one of individual subjectivity. When we look at the history of our politics, as well as of our faith, it is not clear why we should prefer that metaphysical assumption over the competing idea of corporate subjectivity. In truth, both ideas occupy the political imaginary, giving us a politics that embraces both the rule of law and popular sovereignty. We cannot stand outside of this experience and declare one claim to be true and the other false. We make judgments about who we are and how to regard others from within our political practices and beliefs. Distinguishing criminals from enemies is one such judgment: the criminal is always an individual; the enemy is not. Keeping these competing forms of subjectivity in a stable relationship to each other is an endless task of managing the political imagination. In war, whenever the individual breaks through, we find ourselves deeply uncertain about what to do or how to judge acts of killing and being killed. Every war spawns stories of the outbreak of personal comradery between enemies, as they momentarily recognize that they have much in common and “no reason” to kill each other.59 They have become individual subjects in a world that only appears to the corporate subject. If this attitude persists, the war is over, for the exception has passed. At the other end, corporate personhood is policed by the idea of war crimes. These acts are not attributable to the sovereign body, but only to the individual.

#### Second is the aesthetics of war

#### War is spatially defined by invading the borders that separate sovereign states- neglecting this construct causes genocide

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The border has become a geographical representation of national existence. It signifies more than a traditional homeland for an ethnically or religiously defined group. Indeed, claims for an ethnic homeland have an archaic sense about them. They represent a failure of a regime of popular sovereignty to realize an autochthonous political presence. This is often characterized as a failure of law: an ethnic minority might be denied rights, including property rights. More importantly, however, there is a failure in the existential dimension: to link territory and ethnicity is to exclude others within the border from the popular sovereign. They can, in that case, be imagined as the enemy, which can lead to policies of ethnic cleansing. As the enemy, they are to be driven across the border. Because the failure is existential, the effort to “cure” the problem by the extension of legal rights may not succeed – at least not without significant third party intervention. The modern configuration of an autochthonous, territorial politics of sovereignty begins in the revolutions of the 18th century. Revolutionaries proclaim the rights of man, but as the French Declaration tellingly expressed it, rights of man “and of the citizen.”35 The universal is, thereby, linked to a particular space. Whatever their dreams of universality, revolutions have not generally achieved solidarity across borders. Rather, they produce a symbolic investment in borders. Revolutionary regimes set about mapping the state.36 This modern connection of borders to popular sovereignty reached its fullest expression in the post-war decolonization movement. “Uti possidetis” was the governing territorial principle, even though colonial borders failed to map preexisting ethnic communities. Nationhood followed upon statehood, because the popular sovereign brings itself into being by its revolutionary act of self-expression. This actor, the popular sovereign, has become everyone living within the border.37 That moment of self-creation changes the meaning of the colonial border from historically contingent to politically necessary. The border now marks a kind of sacred space, for here the popular sovereign revealed, and thus created, itself.38 This is the territorial regime enshrined in the UN Charter. Every state has the right to defend itself against armed attack.39 An attack is imagined as a cross-border penetration. The Charter text contains no suggestion that a cross-border penetration is any less of an attack if it is done for humanitarian reasons – unless pursuant to Security Council action. Self-defense is not about justice, but about protecting the political space of sovereignty. If it is the case that we are entering an era in which sovereignty is an outdated notion, or in which it is conditioned on the justice of a regime, then we should expect to see a reduction in the symbolic power of the border. Europe is just such an example: the citizens of the EU cannot be enemies of each other for they have the right freely to cross borders.40 A global regime in which all borders could be freely crossed would be one in which the concept of the enemy no longer figured. Territory would give way to property and the enemy to the criminal. The border, accordingly, gives us a geographical representation of the enemy: the enemy transgresses the border. Claims that borders are not just or that they are the product of a history of power do not make the enemy less of an enemy. Under the Charter regime, borders are imagined as forever, because the protection of the border is imagined as the elimination of war. It follows that no state can shift its borders – annex territory – through the use of force, regardless of how just the change might be. A world of perfectly respected borders would be one that [“saves] succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” For the same reason, the Charter regime has dealt much more awkwardly with claims of secession and civil war, viewing them within the paradigm of third party – i.e., cross-border – effects and participation

#### Genocide must be morally prevented at all costs

Berel Lang, Professor of Philosophy, Winter, 1985 The Philosophical Forum

A number of further questions arise in connection with the act of genocide, in particular with the status of its agents. That genocide entails the intended destruction of a group does not by itself imply that the destruction must itself be the act of a group; but the extent of actions required by any design for genocide is so broad as virtually to ensure that the purpose will involve corporate decisions and effort. Admittedly, the same technological advances (in communications, for example) that make genocide as a collective action increasingly possible also increase the likelihood that an individual acting alone could initiate such actions. (When the push of a single button can produce immeasurable catastrophic effects, we discover the possibility of an order of destruction beyond genocide as well: “omnicide.”) But it is also clear that the opprobrium attending the term “genocide” comes in part from its connotation of a corporate action – as if the same act or set of acts would be a lesser fault, easier to understand or even excuse, if a single person rather than a group were responsible, with the connection of the latter (we suppose) to a public moral code and to decisions that would have had to be made or supported collectively. The fact of corporate responsibility sometimes diminish the enormity of an action, as when the difficulty of assigning specific responsibility gives to the action a vagueness of reference similar to that of a natural or otherwise impersonal force. But the almost necessarily corporate origins of genocide seem rather to accentuate its moral enormity, multiplying the individual acts of consciousness that would have been required to produce the larger corporate act.

#### Third is the reciprocal ethics of the battlefield

#### Extermination by drone epitomizes the concept of riskless warfare

Alan W. Dowd June 19, 2012 "The Brewing Backlash against the Drone War " <http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1278> writes on defense and security issues. His work has appeared in Policy Review, Parameters, Military Officer, The American Legion, World Politics Review and other leading publications.

For most Americans, the so-called drone war is a no-brainer: maximum lethality delivered at low economic cost, with zero risk to American personnel—all buffered by the virtual-reality nature of a delivery system that keeps the consequences safely out of sight. That explains why a stunning 83 percent of the country supports President Barack Obama’s use of drones to target suspected terrorists. But the rest of the world isn’t as comfortable with this remote-controlled, auto-pilot war. Indeed, international watchdogs have begun to raise concerns. It’s easy to understand the appeal of drones. First and foremost, drones are the closest thing to risk-free war man has ever invented—at least for those of us on this side of the unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) prowling the skies of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen and Somalia. While the political cost is high when a commander-in-chief loses a pilot, it’s negligible when a commander-in-chief loses a pilotless plane. Compare, for example, the ho-hum reaction to the loss of drones in Iran and the Seychelles under Obama with the international crises other presidents faced when U.S. pilots were shot down over enemy territory: President Dwight Eisenhower was publicly humiliated after the Soviets brought down Gary Powers’ U-2. President John Kennedy was pressured to go to war when Rudolf Anderson was shot down during the Cuban Missile Crisis. And President Bill Clinton had to deal with a hostage crisis after Michael Durant’s Blackhawk was shot down in Mogadishu, and later had to launch a massive search-and-rescue operation deep behind enemy lines when Scott O’Grady’s F-16 crashed in Bosnia. Most UCAV operators, however, are some 7,000 miles away from their targets—and 7,000 miles away from danger. With no risk to U.S. personnel and a high return—the Brookings Institution estimates that as many as 2,209 militants have been killed by drone strikes—Washington has latched on to UCAVs as an important tool in the national-security toolbox and arguably the primary weapon in the post-9/11 campaign against jihadist groups: In the past decade, the U.S. drone fleet has swelled from 50 planes to 7,000. There has been a 1,200-percent increase in combat air patrols by UCAVs since 2005. America’s unmanned air force—including drones deployed by the military and the CIA—has struck targets in Pakistan, Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, Yemen and Somalia. Annual drone strikes in Pakistan increased from one in 2004 to 117 in 2010, when they peaked, before falling below the century mark in 2011. The drone war is following a similar upward trajectory in Yemen. But what looks like a successful counterterrorism campaign to Americans, looks very different to international observers. “In 17 of 20 countries,” a recent Pew survey found, “more than half disapprove of U.S. drone attacks targeting extremist leaders and groups in nations such as Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.” According to Pew, the ongoing drone war feeds “a widespread perception that the U.S. acts unilaterally and does not consider the interests of other countries.” The simple reason for this is that the drone war is completely unilateral and wholly focused on U.S. interests. After all, there’s no UN resolution blessing Washington’s war by remote, and nobody in Pakistan or Yemen is clamoring for Reaper-launched hellfire missiles. Thus, the drone war has reinforced the very image of American unilateralism that Obama once promised to erase, which must come as a shock to the president’s supporters overseas. What many international observers didn’t realize is that historically there has been a remarkable amount of continuity and confluence across administrations in defending the national interest. The Bush-Obama handoff was no exception. Even so, the drone war re-reminds us that, while unilateral action is sometimes necessary, it usually isn’t the most effective way to serve U.S. interests over the long haul. To this point, UN officials have begun to suggest that aspects of the drone war may not conform to international law. “Drone attacks do raise serious questions about compliance with international law,” according to UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, who worries about “indiscriminate killings and injuries of civilians.” “Targeted killing is only lawful when the target is a ‘combatant’ or ‘fighter,’” according to a report issued by the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). “Everything feasible must be done to prevent mistakes and minimize harm to civilians.”

#### Reciprocity is a prior question to the ramifications of conflict - abandoning those ethical ethos allow the US re-imagine war as an existential condition

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Of all of things that organized communities do, going to war is surely the most difficult to understand. Familiarity does not make the cognitive task any easier. War depends upon a willingness of individuals to imagine themselves performing the two most difficult acts: killing and being killed. The close and intimate relationship between these two acts suggests that we should think of warfare as reciprocal acts of self-sacrifice.63 Each side believes it must kill, just as each is willing to die. Figuratively, it is the willingness to die that creates the license to kill; formally, the reciprocity of threat grounds the doctrine of the combatant’s privilege; politically, every war is justified as one of self-defense. The internal ethos of modern warfare arises out of the imagined reciprocal imposition of risk.64 Where reciprocity clearly ends, humanitarian concerns arise. Thus, combatants can surrender. They can also find themselves “hors de combat,” when they are incapable of posing a further threat – e.g., from injury or shipwreck. Of course, the normative idea of reciprocity is only a rough approximation of the actual situation, for it is not the actual threat of the particular combatant that matters. A cook behind the lines may be targeted in the same way as an infantryman on the battlefield. The reciprocity of threat cannot detach itself entirely from the idea of corporate subjectivity. The ethos of reciprocity operates independently of the ends of war. The justice or injustice of those ends does not tell us who can kill or be killed. War has been imagined, instead, as an existential condition. A state will defend itself; it does not first ask whether it is worth defending. Indeed, once war begins – regardless of the reasons for its beginning – it may rapidly become a war of self-defense. Because every war can tend toward the extreme issue of life and death for the state, every war can tend toward a limitless use of force. The modern project of IHL can be understood as an effort to moderate the existential impulse to transgress every limit.65 The ethos of reciprocity is given formal expression in IHL’s creation of the combatant’s privilege. Only those who expose themselves to a reciprocal risk of injury are legally protected for their own acts of violence. The basic norm here builds on the practice of the duel. Consent is constructed through the reciprocal exposure to each other’s act of intentional violence. This ethical norm of reciprocity, however, runs deeper than IHL’s formal expression of its limits. Thus, a person who targets the military may fall outside of IHL’s protection by failing to wear a uniform, but he is in a different ethical position from the person who targets civilians in order to avoid risk. We are often not sure whether to call the former a terrorist.66 At war’s end, he may be entitled to the respect of an adversary.

### Multipolarity

#### Military dominance is waning- even as we spend more success is lagging

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The United States invests more in its military manpower and hardware than all other countries combined. As the political scientist Barry Posen argues, this has allowed it to exercise "command of the commons." With its vast fleet of attack submarines and aircraft carriers, the United States controls the seas--even those that are not its territorial waters and those outside its exclusive economic zone. Its fighter aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles give it unrivaled air superiority. And its dominance of outer space and cyberspace is almost as impressive. But the United States' return on its military investment is falling. Manpower and technology costs are increasing rapidly. The Government Accountability Office reports that since the end of the Cold War, funding for weapons acquisition has increased by 57 percent while the average acquisition cost has increased by 120 percent. According to the Congressional Research Service, between 1999 and 2005, the real cost of supporting an active-duty service member grew by 33 percent. Meanwhile, the benefits of unrestricted defense spending have not kept up with the costs. As Gates put it, U.S. defense institutions have become "accustomed to the post-9/11 decade's worth of 'no questions asked' funding requests," encouraging a culture of waste and inefficiency he described as "a semi-feudal system--an amalgam of fiefdoms without centralized mechanisms to allocate resources." The trend of the last decade is disturbing: as military spending soared, U.S. success abroad sagged. To be clear, the United States continues to field the best-armed, most skilled military in the world. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have bent, but not broken, the all-volunteer force, and the burden of maintaining this formidable force is not unacceptably onerous. The proposed $553 billion base-line defense budget for 2012 represents just 15 percent of the federal budget and less than five percent of GDP. (TO put that figure in perspective, consider that the proposed 2012 budget for Social Security spending tops $760 billion.) Yet current trends will make it harder for the United States to continue to purchase hegemony as easily as it has in the past. Changes in military tactics and technology are eroding the United States' advantages. The proliferation of antiship cruise missiles makes it harder for the U.S. Navy to operate near adversaries' shores. Advanced surface-to-air missiles likewise raise the cost of maintaining U.S. air superiority in hostile theaters. Nationalist and tribal insurgencies, fueled by a brisk small-arms trade, have proved difficult to combat with conventional ground forces

. U.S. defense dominance is getting more expensive at a moment when it is becoming less expensive for other states and actors to challenge the sole superpower.

#### The plan is key to smooth decline but fighting to maintain unipolarity causes lashout

Adam Quinn Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Birmingham International Affairs 87:4 (2011) 803–824 “The art of declining politely: Obama’s prudent presidency and the waning of American power” http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/87\_4quinn.pdf

As noted in the opening passages of this article, the narratives of America’s decline and Obama’s restraint are distinct but also crucially connected. Facing this incipient period of decline, America’s leaders may walk one of two paths. Either the nation can come to terms with the reality of the process that is under way and seek to finesse it in the smoothest way possible. Or it can ‘rage against the dying of the light’, refusing to accept the waning of its primacy. President Obama’s approach, defined by restraint and awareness of limits, makes him ideologically and temperamentally well suited to the former course in a way that, to cite one example, his predecessor was not. He is, in short, a good president to inaugurate an era of managed decline. Those who vocally demand that the President act more boldly are not merely criticizing him; in suggesting that he is ‘weak’ and that a ‘tougher’ policy is needed, they implicitly suppose that the resources will be available to support such a course. In doing so they set their faces against the reality of the coming American decline. 97 If the United States can embrace the spirit of managed decline, then this will clear the way for a judicious retrenchment, trimming ambitions in line with the fact that the nation can no longer act on the global stage with the wide latitude once afforded by its superior power. As part of such a project, it can, as those who seek to qualify the decline thesis have suggested, use the significant resources still at its disposal to smooth the edges of its loss of relative power, preserving influence to the maximum extent possible through whatever legacy of norms and institutions is bequeathed by its primacy. The alternative course involves the initiation or escalation of conflictual scenarios for which the United States increasingly lacks the resources to cater: provocation of a military conclusion to the impasse with Iran; deliberate escalation of strategic rivalry with China in East Asia; commitment to continuing the campaign in Afghanistan for another decade; a costly effort to consistently apply principles of military interventionism, regime change and democracy promotion in response to events in North Africa. President Obama does not by any means represent a radical break with the traditions of American foreign policy in the modern era. Examination of his major foreign policy pronouncements reveals that he remains within the mainstream of the American discourse on foreign policy. In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in December 2009 he made it clear, not for the first time, that he is no pacifist, spelling out his view that ‘the instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace’, and that ‘the United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms’. 98 In his Cairo speech in June the same year, even as he sought distance from his predecessor with the proclamation that ‘no system of government can or should be imposed by one nation on any other’, he also endorsed with only slight qualification the liberal universalist view of civil liberties as transcendent human rights. ‘I … have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things,’ he declared. ‘The ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice; government that is transparent and doesn’t steal from the people; the freedom to live as you choose. These are not just American ideas.’ 99 His Westminster speech repeated these sentiments. Evidently this is not a president who wishes to break signally with the mainstream, either by advocating a radical shrinking of America’s military strength as a good in itself or by disavowing liberal universalist global visions, as some genuine dissidents from the prevailing foreign policy discourse would wish. 100 No doubt sensibly, given the likely political reaction at home, it is inconceivable that he would explicitly declare his strategy to be one of managed American decline. Nevertheless, this is a president who, within the confines of the mainstream, embraces caution and restraint to the greatest extent that one could hope for without an epochal paradigm shift in the intellectual framework of American foreign policy-making. 101 In contemplating the diminished and diminishing weight of the United States upon the scales of global power, it is important not to conflate the question of what will be with that of what we might prefer. It may well be, as critics of the decline thesis sometimes observe, that the prospect of increased global power for a state such as China should not, on reflection, fill any westerner with glee, whatever reservations one may have held regarding US primacy. It is also important not to be unduly deterministic in projecting the consequences of American decline. It may be a process that unfolds gradually and peacefully, resulting in a new order that functions with peace and stability even in the absence of American primacy. Alternatively, it may result in conflict, if the United States clashes with rising powers as it refuses to relinquish the prerogatives of the hegemon, or continues to be drawn into wars with middle powers or on the periphery in spite of its shrinking capacity to afford them. Which outcome occurs will depend on more than the choices of America alone. But the likelihood that the United States can preserve its prosperity and influence and see its hegemony leave a positive legacy rather than go down thrashing its limbs about destructively will be greatly increased if it has political leaders disposed to minimize conflict and consider American power a scarce resource—in short, leaders who can master the art of declining politely. At present it seems it is fortunate enough to have a president who fits the bill.

#### Micro militarism and hot-spot management accelerates the collapse and makes it violent- Rome, Greece, Britain, and Spain prove

McCoy ’10MONDAY, DEC 6, 2010 02:01 PM CST [How America will collapse (by 2025)](http://www.salon.com/2010/12/06/america_collapse_2025/) Four scenarios that could spell the end of the United States as we know it -- in the very near future BY ALFRED MCCOY <http://www.salon.com/2010/12/06/america_collapse_2025/>Alfred W. McCoy is the J.R.W. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author of A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, "From the Cold War to the War on Terror." Later this year, "Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State," a forthcoming book of his, will explore the influence of overseas counterinsurgency operations on the spread of internal security measures here at home

Counterintuitively, as their power wanes, empires often plunge into ill-advised military misadventures. This phenomenon is known among historians of empire as “micro-militarism” and seems to involve psychologically compensatory efforts to salve the sting of retreat or defeat by occupying new territories, however briefly and catastrophically. These operations, irrational even from an imperial point of view, often yield hemorrhaging expenditures or humiliating defeats that only accelerate the loss of power. Embattled empires through the ages suffer an arrogance that drives them to plunge ever deeper into military misadventures until defeat becomes debacle. In 413 BCE, a weakened Athens sent 200 ships to be slaughtered in Sicily. In 1921, a dying imperial Spain dispatched 20,000 soldiers to be massacred by Berber guerrillas in Morocco. In 1956, a fading British Empire destroyed its prestige by attacking Suez. And in 2001 and 2003, the U.S. occupied Afghanistan and invaded Iraq. With the hubris that marks empires over the millennia, Washington has increased its troops in Afghanistan to 100,000, expanded the war into Pakistan, and [extended its commitment](http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175324/tomgram%3A_engelhardt%2C_general_petraeus%27s_two_campaigns/) to 2014 and beyond, courting disasters large and small in this guerilla-infested, nuclear-armed graveyard of empires.

#### Drones make both more likely

Alan Dowd 2013" Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings " http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Issues/WinterSpring\_2013/1\_Article\_Dowd.pdf writes on defense and security issues. His work has appeared in Policy Review, Parameters, Military Officer, The American Legion, World Politics Review and other leading publications.

As Michael Ignatieff asked in 2000, years before the drone war began, “If war becomes unreal to the citizens of modern democracies, will they care enough to restrain and control the violence exercised in their name . . . if they and their sons and daughters are spared the hazards of combat?”29 That question is directly linked to policymakers in the drone age. The risks policymakers take with UCAVs are greater because the accountability is less than with manned aircraft. After all, the loss of a drone is the loss of nothing more than metal. “More willing to lose is more willing to use,” as Daniel Haulman of the Air Force Historical Research Agency puts it.30 Yet as America’s deepening involvement in Yemen underscores, drones may actually make boots-on-the-ground intervention more likely. To identify new targets and authenticate existing targets for the drone war, Washington has quietly sent US troops into Yemen. According to unnamed military officials, the contingent of American troops is growing.31 As the troops identify targets, they become targets. Thus, far from preventing more direct and riskier forms of military engagement, drones are encouraging such engagement—even as many of their operators paradoxically carry out their lethal missions from the safety of bases in Nevada or New Mexico. Make no mistake: this is a good thing for the airmen kept away from harm; however, it may be a bad thing for our republic. Because UCAVs remove humans from the battlespace, they remove the unique characteristics humans bring to the battlespace: deliberation, doubt, fear, gut instinct, and judgment. We need humans in the battlespace, in harm’s way, not just because humans make better judgments than machines—judgment is a very human action—but because having humans in the battlespace can help the commander-in-chief make better judgments about when, where, and whether to wage war. The temptation to gain all the benefits of kinetic military operations with none of the costs, consequences, or risks may be too strong for the Executive branch to resist. Even if the Executive’s inclination toward war is not new—recall Madison’s letter to Jefferson noting how “the Executive is the branch of power most interested in war and most prone to it”—the prospect of risk-free war afforded by pilotless planes is.32 This has been decades in the making, of course. From World War II to Desert Storm to the war on terror, the United States has grown adept at striking its enemies with increasing levels of precision and decreasing levels of risk to those pulling the trigger. But UCAVs erase the risk. And without it, there is one less check on the commander-in-chief’s war-making power. President Obama, for instance, has employed drones in Libya, Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan, and Iran in ways that he has not—and arguably would not—employ manned aircraft. The political cost at home—and diplomatic fallout abroad—is high when a commander-in-chief loses a pilot, but negligible when a commander-in-chief loses a pilotless drone. Just compare the nonreaction to the loss of drones in Djibouti, Iran, and the Seychelles under the Obama administration with the bona fide crises other presidents faced when US pilots were shot down over or near enemy territory. President Dwight Eisenhower weathered international humiliation after the Soviets brought down Francis Powers’ U-2. President John Kennedy was pressed to go to war when Rudolf Anderson’s U-2 was shot down during the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Bill Clinton had to deal with a hostage crisis abroad and a political crisis at home when Michael Durant’s UH-60 Blackhawk was shot down in Mogadishu, and he was forced to mount a massive rescue operation into hostile territory when Scott O’Grady’s F-16 was shot down in Bosnia. In sum, the absence or presence of US personnel in a military operation dramatically changes the calculus of war. Not only do UCAVs lower the threshold for going to war, they also may make it easier to keep wars going, as Paul Miller, a former National Security Council official, observes. Noting that “endless war is unacceptable and dangerous,” Miller argues that the institution of the presidency needs to answer an important question: “When, and under what conditions, will the U.S. government stop using drones to bomb suspected terrorists around the world?”33 Thanks to drones, as Miller’s question suggests, “endless war” is quite possible. In this regard, it’s worth noting that the drone war is an outgrowth of Washington’s post-9/11 campaign against terrorist organizations and regimes—a campaign authorized by the Use of Force Resolution of 18 September 2001. That measure directed the president “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, orga- nizations or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”34 That final clause referring to “future acts of international terror- ism” creates a loophole larger than a Reaper ground-attack drone—with a wingspan of some 66 feet—a loophole that should be tightened through legislation focusing on threats beyond Afghanistan. After all, it would be a stretch to say that the 18 September measure authorized— 11-plus years later—an autopilot war against targets in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and beyond. Those targets may indeed be enemies of, and threats to, the United States. But few of the drone war’s intended targets today—not to mention the unfortunates simply in the wrong place at the wrong time—“planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.” Underscoring this point, The Washington Post recently reported that a growing number of drone strikes in Yemen have targeted “lower-level figures who are suspected of having links to terrorism operatives but are seen mainly as leaders of factions focused on gaining territory in Yemen’s internal struggle.”35 (Emphasis added.) Yet the drone war goes on, largely because there are no Americans in harm’s way—at least not directly.

#### Fortunately a smooth transition is possible- ceding influence through institutional reform creates the ideal conditions for a multipolar evolution

Charles A. Kupchan, Political Science Quarterly, 00323195, Summer 2003, Vol. 118, Issue 2 “The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy” Database: Academic Search Premier

As this new century progresses, unipolarity will give way to a world of multiple centers of power. As this transition proceeds, American grand strategy should focus on making both Europe and East Asia less reliant on U.S. power, while at the same time working with major states in both regions to promote collective management of the global system. The ultimate vision that should guide U.S. grand strategy is the construction of a concert-like directorate of the major powers in North America, Europe, and East Asia. These major powers would together manage developments and regulate relations both within and among their respective regions. They would also coordinate efforts in the battle against terrorism, a struggle that will require patience and steady cooperation among many different nations. Regional centers of power also have the potential to facilitate the gradual incorporation of developing nations into global flows of trade, information, and values. Strong and vibrant regional centers, for reasons of both proximity and culture, often have the strongest incentives to promote prosperity and stability in their immediate peripheries. North America might, therefore, focus on Latin America; Europe on Russia, the Middle East, and Africa; and East Asia on South Asia and Southeast Asia. Mustering the political will and the foresight to pursue this vision will be a formidable task. The United States will need to begin ceding influence and autonomy to regions that have grown all too comfortable with American primacy. Neither American leaders, long accustomed to calling the shots, nor leaders in Europe and East Asia, long accustomed to passing the buck, will find the transition an easy one. But it is far wiser and safer to get ahead of the curve and shape structural change by design than to find unipolarity giving way to a chaotic multipolarity by default. It will take a decade, if not two, for a new international system to evolve. But the decisions taken by the United States early in the twenty-first century will play a critical role in determining whether multipolarity reemerges peacefully or brings with it the competitive jockeying that has so frequently been the precursor to great power war in the past.[\*]

#### Under these conditions progressive forces would converge into a pluricentric world system- it's the only scenario capable of solving systemic violence

Samir Amin 2006 "Beyond US Hegemony? Assessing the Prospects for a Multipolar World" http://onkwehonwerising.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/amin-samir-beyond-us-hegemony-assessing-the-prospects-for-a-multipolar-world.pdf From 1947 to 1957 he studied in Paris, gaining a diploma in political science (1952) before graduating in statistics (1956) and economics (1957). He worked in Cairo from 1957 to 1960 as a research officer for the government's Institution for Economic Management, then as adviser to the Ministry of Planning in Mali till1963, when he was offered a fellowship at the Institut Africain de Développement Économique et de Planification (IDEP). As well as being a professor at the universities of Poitier, Dakar and Paris, he was director of IDEP from 1970 -1980, when he became director of the Third World Forum in Dakar.

Opening debate on the long transition to world socialism While recognizing Lenin’s mistaken view of the real challenges, and his misjudgement of the ripeness for revolution, we need to go beyond criticism and self-criticism of the history of twentieth-century Communism, by openly and inventively fostering debate on the positive alternative strategies for the twenty- strategies for the twenty-ﬁrst century. Here I can do no more than brieﬂy summarize the points I have made elsewhere. • Strategies must be devised in response to the challenges of the long transition from world capitalism to world socialism. • In the course of this long transition, social, economic and political systems produced by the struggles of the reproductive elements of capitalist society will combine, in contradictory fashion, with elements tending to initiate and develop socialist social relations. Two conocial relations. Two conﬂicting logics will therefore be present, in permanent combination and permanent contradiction with each other. • Progress in this direction is necessary and possible in all regions of the world capitalist system, both the imperialist centres and the compradorized peripheries. Of course, by force of circumstance, there will have to be concrete and speciﬁc intermediate stages, especially with regard to the contrasts between centres and peripheries. • Social, ideological and political forces expressing, however confusedly, the interests of popular classes are already working in the directions indicated. The so-called ‘alter-globalization’ movements are material proof of this. But these movements serve as vehicles for different alternatives, some progressive (in the above sense), some deluded or even clearly reactionary (para-fascist responses to the challenges). To politicize the debate – in the true and proper sense of the term – is the sine qua non for building what I call ‘convergence in diversity’ of the progressive forces. • The victims of the deployment of neoliberal capitalism are the majority in all parts of the world, and socialism must be capable of mobilizing the new historical opportunity this creates. But it will be able to do this only if it can take account of the changes resulting from the technological revolutions, which have completely altered the social architecture once and for all. Communism must no longer be the banner only of the ‘industrial working class’, in the old sense of the term; it can become the banner representing the future of the broad majority of working people, despite the diversity of their situations. To rebuild the unity of working people – both those who beneﬁt from a certain stabilization of the system and those who are excluded from it – is today a major challenge for the inventive thinking that is needed for communist renewal. In the peripheries, this also means organizing huge movements to establish an equal right of access to the land for the whole peasantry. Renewal is all the more necessary because it has often been forgotten that the peasantry is still a half of humanity, and that capitalism in all its forms is incapable of solving this major problem. • An effective strategy for action within this perspective must be capable of producing simultaneous advances in three directions: social progress, democratization and the construction of a pluricentric world system. The political democracy usually proposed as an accompaniment to the economic options of liberal capitalism is destined to strip democracy of all credibility, in quite dramatic ways. At the same time, social progress from the top down is no longer acceptable as a substitute for inventive formulas involving the democratic power of popular classes. There will be no socialism without democracy, but also no democratic advances without social progress. Lastly, in view of the persistence of national diversity and the political cultures shaping it, as well as the inequality historically produced by the deployment of world capitalism, it is clear that a margin of opportunity for the necessary social and democratic advances will require the construction of a pluricentric world system. And the And the ﬁrst condition for this, of course, is to defeat Washington’s project for military control of the planet.

#### Methodological nationalism is a flawed framework for analysis – means you should be suspect of all their impact claims.

Beck and Sznaider 10 – (Jan 2010, Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider, Professor of sociology at Munich's Ludwig-Maximilian University and the London School of Economics; and professor of sociology at the Academic College of Tel-Aviv-Yaffo, Israel. “Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: a research agenda,” British Journal of Sociology Volume 61, January 2010 Wiley InterSciences)

Methodological nationalism takes the following premises for granted: it equates societies with nation-state societies and sees states and their governments as the primary focus of social-scientific analysis. It assumes that humanity is naturally divided into a limited number of nations, which organize themselves internally as nation-states and externally set boundaries to distinguish themselves from other nation-states. And it goes further: this outer delimitation as well as the competition between nation-states, represent the most fundamental category of political organization. The premises of the social sciences assume the collapse of social boundaries with state boundaries, believing that social action occurs primarily within and only secondarily across, these divisions: [Like] stamp collecting . . . social scientists collected distinctive national social forms. Japanese industrial relations, German national character, the American constitution, the British class system – not to mention the more exotic institutions of tribal societies – were the currency of social research. The core disciplines of the social sciences, whose intellectual traditions are reference points for each other and for other fields, were therefore domesticated– in the sense of being preoccupied not with Western and world civilization as wholes but with the ‘domestic’ forms of particular national societies (Shaw 2000: 68). The critique of methodological nationalism should not be confused with the thesis that the end of the nation-state has arrived. One does not criticize methodological individualism by proclaiming the end of the individual. Nation-states (as all the research shows – see also the different contributions in this volume) will continue to thrive or will be transformed into transnational states. What, then, is the main point of the critique of methodological nationalism? It adopts categories of practice as categories of analysis. The decisive point is that national organization as a structuring principle of societal and political action can no longer serve as the orienting reference point for the social scientific observer. One cannot even understand the re-nationalization or re-ethnification trend in Western or Eastern Europe without a cosmopolitan perspective. In this sense, the social sciences can only respond adequately to the challenge of globalization if they manage to overcome methodological nationalism and to raise empirically and theoretically fundamental questions within specialized fields of research, and thereby elaborate the foundations of a newly formulated cosmopolitan social science. As many authors – including the ones in this volume – criticize, in the growing discourse on cosmopolitanism there is a danger of fusing the ideal with the real. What cosmopolitanism is cannot ultimately be separated from what cosmopolitanism should be. But the same is true of nationalism. The small, but important, difference is that in the case of nationalism the value judgment of the social scientists goes unnoticed because methodological nationalism includes a naturalized conception of nations as real communities. In the case of the cosmopolitan ‘Wertbeziehung’ (Max Weber, value relation), by contrast, this silent commitment to a nation-state centred outlook of sociology appears problematic. In order to unpack the argument in the two cases it is necessary to distinguish between the actor perspective and the observer perspective. From this it follows that a sharp distinction should be made between methodological and normative nationalism. The former is linked to the social-scientific observer perspective, whereas the latter refers to the negotiation perspectives of political actors. In a normative sense, nationalism means that every nation has the right to self-determination within the context of its cultural, political and even geographical boundaries and distinctiveness. Methodological nationalism assumes this normative claim as a socio-ontological given and simultaneously links it to the most important conflict and organization orientations of society and politics. These basic tenets have become the main perceptual grid of the social sciences. Indeed, this social-scientific stance is part of the nation-state's own self-understanding. A national view on society and politics, law, justice, memory and history governs the sociological imagination. To some extent, much of the social sciences has become a prisoner of the nationstate. That this was not always the case is shown in Bryan Turner's paper in this issue (Turner 2006: 133–51). This does not mean, of course, that a cosmopolitan social science can and should ignore different national traditions of law, history, politics and memory. These traditions exist and become part of our cosmopolitan methodology. The comparative analyses of societies, international relations, political theory, and a significant part of history and law all essentially function on the basis of methodological nationalism. This is valid to the extent that the majority of positions in the contemporary debates in social and political science over globalization can be systematically interpreted as transdisciplinary reflexes linked to methodological nationalism. These premises also structure empirical research, for example, in the choice of statistical indicators, which are almost always exclusively national. A refutation of methodological nationalism from a strictly empirical viewpoint is therefore difficult, indeed, almost impossible, because so many statistical categories and research procedures are based on it. It is therefore of historical importance for the future development of the social sciences that this methodological nationalism, as well as the related categories of perception and disciplinary organization, be theoretically, empirically, and organizationally re-assessed and reformed. What is at stake here? Whereas in the case of the nation-state centred perspective there is an historical correspondence between normative and methodological nationalism (and for this reason this correspondence has mainly remained latent), this does not hold for the relationship between normative and methodological cosmopolitanism. In fact, the opposite is true: even the re-nationalization or re-ethnification of minds, cultures and institutions has to be analysed within a cosmopolitan frame of reference. Cosmopolitan social science entails the systematic breaking up of the process through which the national perspective of politics and society, as well as the methodological nationalism of political science, sociology, history, and law, confirm and strengthen each other in their definitions of reality. Thus it also tackles (what had previously been analytically excluded as a sort of conspiracy of silence of conflicting basic convictions) the various developmental versions of de-bounded politics and society, corresponding research questions and programmes, the strategic expansions of the national and international political fields, as well as basic transformations in the domains of state, politics, and society. This paradigmatic de-construction and re-construction of the social sciences from a national to a cosmopolitan outlook can be understood and methodologically justified as a ‘positive problem shift’ (Lakatos 1970), a broadening of horizons for social science research making visible new realities encouraging new research programmes (Back and Lau 2005 and Beck, Banss and Lau 2003: 1–35). Against the background of cosmopolitan social science, it suddenly becomes obvious that it is neither possible to distinguish clearly between the national and the international, nor, correspondingly, to make a convincing contrast between homogeneous units. National spaces have become de-nationalized, so that the national is no longer national, just as the international is no longer international. New realities are arising: a new mapping of space and time, new co-ordinates for the social and the political are emerging which have to be theoretically and empirically researched and elaborated.

#### This makes extinction inevitable.

Smith 03 – (Roger, PhD, professor of political science at University of Pennsylvania, “Stories Of Peoplehood, The Politics and Morals of Political Membership,” p. 166-169)

It is certainly important to oppose such evolutionary doctrines by all intellectually credible means. But many have already been widely discred¬ited; and today it may well prove salutary, even indispensable, to heighten awareness of human identity as shared membership in a species engaged in an ages-long process of adapting to often dangerous and unforgiving natural and man-made environments.20 When we see ourselves in the light of general evolutionary patterns, we become aware that it is gen¬uinely possible for a species such as ourselves to suffer massive setbacks or even to become extinct if we pursue certain dangerous courses of ac¬tion. That outcome does not seem to be in any human's interest. And when we reflect on the state of our species today, we see or should see at least five major challenges to our collective survival, much less our col¬lective nourishing, that are in some respects truly unprecedented. These are all challenges of our own making, however, and so they can all be met through suitably cooperative human efforts. The first is our ongoing vulnerability to the extraordinary weapons of mass destruction that we have been building during the last half century. The tense anticipations of imminent conflagration that characterized the Cold War at its worst are now behind us, but the nuclear arsenals that were so threatening are largely still with us, and indeed the governments and, perhaps, terrorist groups possessed of some nuclear weaponry have continued to proliferate. The second great threat is some sort of environmental disaster, brought on by the by-products of our efforts to achieve ever-accelerating industrial and post-industrial production and distribution of an incredible range of good and services. Whether it is global warming, the spread of toxic wastes, biospheric disruptions due to new agricultural techniques, or some combination of these and other consequences of human interfer¬ence with the air, water, climate, and plant and animal species that sustain us, any major environmental disaster can affect all of humanity. Third, as our economic and technological systems have become ever more interconnected, the danger that major economic or technological failures in one part of the world might trigger global catastrophes may well increase. Such interdependencies can, to be sure, be a source of strength as well as weakness, as American and European responses to the East Asian and Mexican economic crises of the 1990s indicated. Still, if global capitalism were to collapse or a technological disaster comparable to the imagined Y2K doomsday scenario were to occur, the consequences today would be more far-reaching than they would have been for comparable developments in previous centuries. Fourth, as advances in food production, medical care, and other tech¬nologies have contributed to higher infant survival rates and longer lives, the world's population has been rapidly increasing, placing intensifying pressures on our physical and social environments in a great variety of ways. These demographic trends, necessarily involving all of humanity, threaten to exacerbate all the preceding problems, generating political and military conflicts, spawning chronic and acute environmental damages, and straining the capacities of economic systems. The final major challenge we face as a species is a more novel one, and it is one that may bring consciousness of our shared "species in-terests" even more to the fore. In the upcoming century, human be¬ings will increasingly be able to affect their own genetic endowment, in ways that might potentially alter the very sort of organic species that we are. Here as with modern weapons, economic processes, and pop¬ulation growth, we face risks that our efforts to improve our condition may go disastrously wrong, potentially endangering the entire human race. Yet the appeal of endowing our children with greater gifts is suffi¬ciently powerful that organized efforts to create such genetic technologies capable of "redesigning humans" are already burgeoning, both among reputable academic researchers and less restrained, but well-endowed, fringe groups.21 To be sure, an awareness of these as well as other potential dangers affecting all human beings is not enough by itself to foster moral outlooks that reject narrow and invidious particularistic conceptions of human identity. It is perfectly possible for leaders to feel that to save the species, policies that run roughshod over the claims of their rivals are not simply justified but morally demanded. Indeed, like the writers I have exam¬ined here, my own more egalitarian and cosmopolitan moral leanings probably stem originally from religious and Kantian philosophical influ-ences, not from any consciousness of the common "species interests" of human beings. But the ethically constitutive story which contends that we have such interests, and that we can see them as moral interests, seems quite realistic, which is of some advantage in any such account. And under the circumstances just sketched, it is likely that more and more people will become persuaded that today, those shared species in¬terests face more profound challenges than they have in most of human history. If so, then stressing our shared identity as members of an evolving species may serve as a highly credible ethically constitutive story that can challenge particularistic accounts and foster support for novel political arrangements. Many more people may come to feel that it is no longer safe to conduct their political lives absorbed in their traditional communi¬ties, with disregard for outsiders, without active concern about the issues that affect the whole species and without practical collaborative efforts to confront those issues. That consciousness of shared interests has the potential to promote stronger and much more inclusive senses of trust, as people come to realize that the dangers and challenges they face in com¬mon matter more than the differences that will doubtless persist. I think this sort of awareness of a shared "species interests" also can support senses of personal and collective worth, though I acknowledge that this is not obviously the case. Many people find the spectacle of the human species struggling for survival amidst rival life forms and an unfeeling material world a bleak and dispiriting one. Many may still feel the need to combine acceptance of an evolutionary constitutive story with reli¬gious or philosophical accounts that supply some stronger sense of moral purpose to human and cosmic existence. But if people are so inclined, then nothing I am advocating here stands in the way of such combinations. Many persons, moreover, may well find a sustaining sense of moral worth in a conception of themselves as con¬tributors to a species that has developed unique capacities to deliberate and to act responsibly in regard to questions no other known species can yet conceive: how should we live? What relationships should we have, individually and collectively, to other people, other life forms, and the broader universe? In time, I hope that many more people may come to agree that humanity has shared responsibilities of stewardship for the animate and physical worlds around us as well as ourselves, ultimately seeking to promote the flourishing of all insofar as we are capable and the finitude of existence permits. But even short of such a grand sense of species vocation, the idea that we are part of humanity's endeavor to strive and thrive across ever-greater expanses of space and time may be one that can inspire a deep sense of worth in many if not most human beings. Hence it does not seem unrealistic to hope that we can encourage in¬creased acceptance of a universalistic sense of human peoplehood that may help rein in popular impulses to get swept up in more parochial tales of their identities and interests. In the years ahead, this ethical sen¬sibility might foster acceptance of various sorts of transnational political arrangements to deal with problems like exploitative and wildly fluctuat¬ing international financial and labor markets, destructive environmental and agricultural practices, population control, and the momentous issue of human genetic modifications. These are, after all, problems that appear to need to be dealt with on a near-global scale if they are to be dealt with satisfactorily. Greater acceptance of such arrangements would necessar¬ily entail increased willingness to view existing governments at all levels as at best only "semi-sovereign," authoritative over some issues and not others, in the manner that acceptance of multiple particularistic constitu-tive stories would also reinforce. In the resulting political climate, it might become easier to construct the sorts of systems of interwoven democratic international, regional, state and local governments that theorists of "cos¬mopolitan democracy," "liberal multicultural nationalism," and "differ¬entiated democracy" like David Held, Will Kymlicka, Iris Young, William Connolly, and Jurgen Habermas all envision.

#### Put away your state bad offense-rejecting sovereignty exacerbates inequalities and prevents emancipation

Tara McCormack 10, Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester, PhD in IR from the University of Westminster, “Critique, Security and Power: The Political Limits to Emancipatory Approaches,” p139, google books

Critics of critical and emancipatory theory have raised pertinent problems in terms both of the idealism of critical approaches and their problematic relationship to contemporary liberal intervention. Critical theorists themselves are aware that their prescriptions seem to be hard to separate from contemporary discourses and practices of power, yet critical theorists do not seem to be able to offer any understanding of why this might be. However, the limitations to critical and emancipatory approaches cannot be overcome by distinguishing themselves from liberal internationalist policy. In fact a closer engagement with contemporary security policies and discourse would show the similarities with critical theory and that both suffer from the same limitations. The limitations of critical and emancipatory approaches are to be found in critical prescriptions in the contemporary political context. Jahn is right to argue that critical theory is idealistic, but this needs to be explained why. Douzinas is right to argue that critical theory becomes a justification for power and this needs to be explained why. The reasons for this remain undertheorised. I argue here that critical and emancipatory approaches lack a fundamental understanding of what is at stake in the political realm. For critical theorists the state and sovereignty represent oppressive structures that work against human freedom. There is much merit to this critique of the inequities of the state system. However, the problem is that freedom or emancipation are not simply words that can breathe life into international affairs but in the material circumstances of the contemporary world must be linked to political constituencies, that is men and women who can give content to that freedom and make freedom a reality. Critical and emancipatory theorists fail to understand that there must be a political content to emancipation and new forms of social organisation. Critical theorists seek emancipation and argue for new forms of political community above and beyond the state, yet there is nothing at the moment beyond the state that can give real content to those wishes. There is no democratic world government and it is simply nonsensical to argue that the UN, for example, is a step towards global democracy. Major international institutions are essentially controlled by powerful states. To welcome challenges to sovereignty in the present political context cannot hasten any kind of more just world order in which people really matter (to paraphrase Lynch). Whatever the limitations of the state, and there are many, at the moment the state represents the only framework in which people might have a chance to have some meaningful control over their lives.

### Plan

#### Text: The United States federal government should statutorily restrict war powers authority of the President of the United States to authorize drone targeted killings through the AUMF

### Solvency

#### Restricting the AUMF solves inevitable warfare- creates structural checks to a riskless system

BENJAMIN H. FRIEDMAN JUNE 19, 2012 "Drones, Special Operations, and Whimsical Wars" http://www.cato.org/blog/drones-special-operations-whimsical-wars Benjamin H. Friedman is a research fellow in defense and homeland security studies. His areas of expertise include counter-terrorism, homeland security and defense politics.

Asked the last week on 60 Minutes how many shooting wars the United States is in, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta took a moment to answer. He eventually said we are going after al Qaeda in Pakistan and its “nodes” in Somalia, Yemen, and North Africa. Somehow, he left out the indefinite war we have going in Afghanistan. It’s no wonder that Panetta can’t keep track of the wars he’s supposed to manage. On top of Afghanistan and the drone campaigns, 12,000 U.S. special operations forces are distributed around dozens of countries, increasingly outside declared war zones, where they train foreign militaries, collect intelligence, and occasionally launch lethal raids. As just reported in the Washington Post, some of these forces are now operating a dozen bases across Northern Africa, where their activities include overseeing contractors flying surveillance aircraft. Despite the Obama administration’s claims of great progress in fighting al Qaeda, the global shadow war shows no signs of abating. The official rationale for using force across the world is that al Qaeda is global. But that’s true only thanks to a capacious definition of al Qaeda that imposes a sense of false unity of disparate groups. The always-overrated remnant of the organization that sponsored the 9/11 attacks barely exists anymore, even in Pakistan. Our counterterrorism efforts are directed mostly against others: terrorists that take up al Qaeda’s name and desire to kill westerners but have limited links to the real McCoy, as in Yemen and North Africa, and insurgents friendly to jihadists but mostly consumed by local disputes, like the Taliban in Afghanistan, al Shabaab in Somalia, and al Qaeda’s Islamist allies in southern Yemen. Like the phony Communist monolith in the Cold War, the myth of a unified, global “al Qaeda” makes actions against vaguely-linked entities—many with no obvious interest in the United States—seem like a coherent campaign against globe trotting menace bent on our destruction. The real reason we are fighting so much these days is that war is too easy. International and domestic restraints on the use of U.S. military power are few. And unrestrained power tends to be exercised. Presidents can use it whimsically, at least until they do something costly that creates a backlash and wakes up public opposition. Drones and special operations forces made this problem worse. Most of the world is what the military calls a permissive environment, especially since the end of the Cold War. Most places lack forces capable of keeping our military out. Many potential allies invite it. The risks traditionally associated with war—invasion, mass death, etc.—are now alien to Americans. Since the draft ended, the consequences of even bad wars for most of us are minor: unsettling media stories and mildly higher taxes deferred by deficits. That’s why, as Nuno Monteiro argues, the U.S. military was already quite busy in the 1990s despite the absence of real enemies. Because war is so cheap, the public has little reason to worry much about it. That leaves elected representatives without any electoral incentive to restrain presidential war powers. No surprise then that the imperial presidency grew as American power did. Technology gains and secrecy exacerbate the problem. Even more than strategic bombing from high altitude, which already prevented U.S. casualties, drones cheapen warfare. Covert raids are riskier, of course, but secrecy limits public appreciation of those risks. The president and his advisors assure us that they use these forces only after solemn debate and nights spent (badly) reading just war theory. But a White House that debates the use of force only with itself short-circuits the democratic process. That is not just a constitutional problem but a practical one. Broad debate among competing powers generally produces better decisions than narrower, unilateral ones. That is why is it is naïve to suggest, as John Fabian Witt did last week in a New York Times op-ed, that the executive branch is developing sensible legal institutions to manage the gray area between war and peace occupied by drone strikes. What’s needed are checks and balances. That means Congress needs to use its war powers. First, Congress should rewrite the 2001 Authorization of Military Force, which has morphed into a legal rationale for doing whatever presidents want in the name of counterterrorism. That bill authorized force against the organizers of the September 11 attacks and those who aided them, which seemed to mean al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and maybe Pakistan. The new law should state that acts of war, including drone strikes, in other places require a new authorization of force. If Congress is for bombing stuff in Yemen and Somalia, it should debate those missions. Second, Congress should reform the convoluted laws governing the deployment of special operations forces, making their use more onerous and transparent. Those forces should engage in covert action only after a presidential finding, as with the CIA. Third, Congress should require that taxes or offsets fund wars. That would increase debate about their worth. The trouble, as already noted, is that Congress has no interest in doing these things. Congressional leaders are today more interested in policing leaks about the president’s unilateral exercise of war powers than in restraining them. Short of a military disaster involving special operations forces or drones, this seems unlikely to change in the short term. In the longer term, we need a restoration of Congress’ institutional identity. Even without an electoral reason, politicians should want to exercise war powers simply because they can—because people like power. That’s the assumption behind Edward Corwin’s notion that the constitution’s is an “invitation to struggle” over foreign policy. Something has obstructed Congress’ desire to struggle. Those concerned by the president’s promiscuous use of force should try to identify and remove the obstruction.

#### Statutory restriction reinstate congressional war power- that's key to check mission creep and perpetual war

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. March 24, 2011 "Should the President Have Asked Congress for a Declaration of War Against Libya Before Bombing? No" http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/03/should-the-president-have-asked-congress-for-a-declaration-of-war-against-libya-before-bombing-no James Jay Carafano, a leading expert in national security and foreign policy challenges, is The Heritage Foundation’s Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, E. W. Richardson Fellow, and Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies.

No one declares war anymore! Not since World War II has any nation declared war on another — with the possible exception of a 1967 declaration against Israel by five Arab countries. While fighting remains as common as ever, the practice of issuing formal declarations has gone out of style. It's not the first time that's happened. Formal declarations of war fell out of fashion during the 17th century, too. Our Founding Fathers thought that was wrong, and so they stuck a requirement in the Constitution saying Congress must approve a declaration before the nation went to war. But that provision was never intended as an absolute check on executive power. Not all military operations constitute wars. Nor is a war declaration the only legitimate way Congress can signal support for military operations. As "The Heritage Guide to the Constitution" points out, there have been only five declared wars in our nation's history, but numerous other hostilities "have been specifically authorized by Congress through instruments other than formal declarations." The framers of the Constitution, however, did think there was something important about "formal" declarations. Democracies, they felt, were fundamentally different from other states and ought to be as open and transparent as possible about what they were doing. War declarations are part of that transparency regimen. When you declare war, you specify your grievances and how you expect to resolve them. That is actually a good practice, and it is too bad democracies have gotten away from it. Yet, clearly, President Barack Obama has the authority to order the current operations in Libya. The Constitution divides the powers of initiating military actions between the executive and Congress to foster deliberation and consultation to the extent possible under the circumstances. But at the end of the day, the president is the commander in chief. He alone bears the legal and moral responsibility for ordering U.S. armed forces into action. What rankles most about the president's decision on Libya is the lack of open deliberation and discussion. Certainly he had time to consult Congress and the American people, yet he spent much more time consulting the U.N. Security Council. It is discomforting to see an American president seemingly defer to the United Nations rather than lead the country. Moreover, the U.N. resolution he got does not help much. The United Nations is not sovereign, nor do we need its permission to act. Furthermore, the resolution is vague and open-ended. And Obama so far has done little to provide clarity about our objectives and our commitment. These are serious concerns. The lack of congressional consultation and the vagueness of the mission deny Americans what the Constitution intended: a clear statement of purpose about U.S. military action. It is vital to avoid "mission creep" and perpetual fighting. All that said, a declaration of war against Libya would be a bad idea, because going to war in Libya is a bad idea. That is not to say that the United States should do nothing, but Libya does not merit significant, protracted operations by U.S. forces. You fight wars to protect vital national interests. The United States has legitimate interests in the outcome of the Libyan turmoil: seeing Gadhafi brought to justice, and not seeing a new terrorist haven established, a humanitarian crisis, or civil war spreading to nearby nations. But these concerns fall short of being vital national interests and can be addressed through measures short of war.

#### Mission creep makes intervention inevitable- endless wars justified by liberal internationalism wreck the economy and dilute diplomacy

Gordon N. Bardos May 24, 2013 "A Foreign Policy of Mission Creep"http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/foreign-policy-mission-creep-8514?page=1 Gordon N. Bardos is the assistant director of the Harriman Institute at Columbia University.

In an eye-opening article in these spaces a few weeks ago, James Joyner cited the words of an American general in Afghanistan who, in reciting his troops’ successes in Helmand province, noted that "Roads have been paved and markets secured, allowing commerce to grow in places like Marja, Nad Ali and Lashkar Gah . . ." Both the general and his troops undoubtedly performed the mission their country gave them professionally and with dedication. But the exchange still begs utterly valid questions: how, when and why did the growth of commerce in Marja, Nad Ali and Lashkar Gah become worth American lives or taxpayer dollars? And what might this portend for our potential involvement in Syria? Liberal internationalism, so popular in Washington over the past two decades, has transformed the traditional purpose of American foreign policy—historically understood as systematizing relations between sovereign states and attempting to influence the behavior of other countries—into the much more grandiose attempt to remake the political cultures and economic systems of states and societies thousands of miles from our shores. The result of this transformation of U.S. foreign-policy goals has been what Andrew Bacevich once aptly described as “endless war,” in which the U.S. military is used as an instrument for nation- and state-building in open-ended missions around the world. Consider, as outlined below, the record of some of our recent interventions, and the discrepancy in the time required to achieve their respective military and civilian objectives. Needless to say, long-running interventions cost real money. The post-WWII reconstruction of Germany is estimated to have cost some $35 billion in 2011 dollars. Bosnia after 1995 received more money than any country in Europe under the Marshall Plan. As of April 2013, the United States had spent $60 billion on reconstruction in Iraq and $93 billion in Afghanistan (and as of 2005 Kosovo had received twenty-five times the amount provided to Afghanistan in per capita terms). These amounts do not even include these wars’ financial costs, or their costs in human lives. The enormous discrepancy between achieving the military and civilian objectives of our foreign interventions is intimately connected to the recent Washingtonian vogue for Clausewitz’s conflation of war with politics and diplomacy. Thus, in the 1990s Richard Holbrooke became a proponent of “diplomacy backed by force,” and in a memorable exchange between Madeleine Albright and her UK counterpart in the UN Security Council, Albright claimed that “after all, war is merely an extension of politics by other means.” To which her British colleague replied “Yes, Madeleine, that is exactly what Clausewitz said. But he was a German, and the Germans listened to him. Look what happened to them, twice.” The obvious problem here is that with the militarization of U.S. foreign policy and our increasingly grandiose ambitions abroad, we have gone down an intellectual slippery slope: if war is the equivalent of diplomacy and diplomacy is equal to nation-building, it therefore follows that war is the same as nation-building. This equation perhaps explains why the U.S. Army now has considerably more civil-affairs personnel than the U.S. State Department has foreign-service officers. Unfortunately, our grandiose ambition to effect transformative change in far-off countries has not achieved any notable successes. Consider Washington’s pet project in Bosnia, the Muslim-Croat Federation. After Bosnia’s October 2010 elections, it took some six months for the federation to form a government, which Bosnia’s own Central Electoral Commission then ruled had been formed illegally. Bosnia’s international colonial administration, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), however, suspended the ruling. Some twelve months later, political winds in Bosnia shifted, the questionable government fell apart, and a party in the prior ruling coalition went to the federation’s constitutional court to prevent its cadres from being purged from the new government. Unfortunately, the constitutional court could not rule on the issue, since for the past five years Muslim and Croat parties have been unable to agree on replacing the court’s four missing judges. Many of these problems stem from an internationally approved effort to substitute two Bosnian-Croat parties representing some 90 percent of the Bosnian-Croat electorate with a marginal (but malleable) party which scraped up about two percent of the Croat vote. Unfortunately for the international architects of this plan, even this small party has fallen apart, with a faction loyal to the federation president forming a new microparty. Its chances for success at Bosnia’s next elections seem slim, however, since said federation president has recently been arrested. The divided city of Mostar does not have a functioning legal government because it was unable to hold elections in 2012. The OHR imposed a specific electoral regime on the city in 2004, but its solution to the problem has been ruled unconstitutional. In December 2009, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Bosnia’s current electoral law violates the rights of ethnic minorities to be elected to statewide office, but Muslim and Croat politicians can’t agree on how to amend the constitution. A few months ago, the American ambassador in Sarajevo announced an attempt to reform this chaos, but he is leaving his post in a few weeks. In Iraq, contra Marx’s proposed sequence of events, the farce that has become our Bosnian state-building project is repeated as tragedy. Consider the reality of Iraq in April 2013, a full decade after “mission accomplished” was proclaimed. On April 12, bomb attacks in mosques in Baghdad and Diyala province killed eleven people and wounded 30 more. On April 15, thirty-one people were killed and over two hundred wounded in coordinated bombings in Baghdad, Tuz Khurmatu, Kirkuk, and Nasiriyah. On April 18, twenty-seven people were killed and dozens more injured in a Baghdad café bombing. On April 23, twenty people were killed in clashes between security forces and anti-government Sunni protesters near Kirkuk. On April 24, seven people were killed and more than twenty injured in a car bombing in the Shia district of al-Husseiniyah near Baghdad. On April 25, ten policemen and thirty gunmen were killed in clashes in Mosul. On April 29, eighteen people were killed and dozens injured after five car bombs went off in Shia-majority provinces in southern Iraq. All told, surveying the nation-building achievements of our foreign policy over the past couple of decades is not encouraging. Last summer, seventeen years after the ostensible end of the Bosnian conflict, a local politician told his constituents “The war is not over. We are still fighting the same war.” Iraqi prime minister Nuri al-Maliki recently warned that Iraq is in danger of returning to “sectarian war,” and notwithstanding Donald Rumsfeld’s view that “freedom is untidy” and “stuff happens,” an Iraq on the cusp of civil war under increasing Iranian influence is not where the country was supposed to be ten years after the fall of Saddam Hussein. And in Afghanistan, by this time next year there is a good chance the Taliban will again be calling the shots. The lessons of recent decades suggest that American military might can probably (at least eventually) remove Assad from power, but there is precious little historical evidence to show that we can substantively shape the end-state in Syria—the “end-state” here being understood as the six to twelve months after the Washington war lobby and the media lose interest and move on to some more fashionable crisis. President Obama’s inability to get four senators from his own party to vote for gun reform is a stark, telling reminder of the limits of U.S. power, executive and otherwise. Against Clausewitz and his latter-day enthusiasts, the late scholar of international relations Edwin Fedder frequently noted that if you have to resort to military force, your diplomacy has already failed. As the Obama administration debates the pros and cons of intervening in Syria, understanding the differences between diplomacy, waging war and nation-building become more urgent—as does developing a realistic appreciation for what military intervention can and cannot achieve.

# 2AC

### 2AC anthropocentrism

Framework – we should be able to weigh the normative effects of the plan against the criticism – indicts of epistemology, ontology, or other framing methods should be treated as solvency indicts not apriori reasons to reject – infinite interpretation of methods – our interp. is best for education

Perm do both

Perm do the alt and the plan

Perm do the alternative in every other instance – justified because the alt is vague – a moving target – impossible to generate offense with each new link – vi for fairness

#### Human-centeredness is key to solving climate – Aff is a DA.

David Schmidtz, 2000. Philosophy, University of Arizona, Environmental Ethics, p. 379-408

#### Like economic reasoning, ecological reasoning is reasoning about equilibria and perturbations that keep systems from converging on equilibria. Like economic reasoning, ecological reasoning is reasoning about competition and unintended consequences, and the internal logic of systems, a logic that dictates how a system responds to attempts to manipulate it. Environmental activism and regulation do not automatically improve the environment. It is a truism in ecology, as in economics, that well-intentioned interventions do not necessarily translate into good results. Ecology (human and nonhuman) is complicated, our knowledge is limited, and environmentalists are themselves only human. Intervention that works with the system’s logic rather than against it can have good consequences. Even in a centrally planned economy, the shape taken by the economy mainly is a function not of the central plan but of how people respond to it, and people respond to central plans in ways that best serve their purposes, not the central planner’s. Therefore, even a dictator is in no position simply to decide how things are going to go. Ecologists understand that this same point applies in their own discipline. They understand that an ecology’s internal logic limits the directions in which it can be taken by would-be ecological engineers. Within environmental philosophy, most of us have come around to something like Aldo Leopold’s view of humans as plain citizens of the biotic community.[[21]](http://www.theihs.org/libertyguide/hsr/hsr.php?id=41&print=1" \l "_ftn22) As Bryan Norton notes, the contrast between anthropocentrism and biocentrism obscures the fact that we increasingly need to be nature-centered to be properly human-centered; we need to focus on "saving the ecological systems that are the context of human cultural and economic activities." [[22]](http://www.theihs.org/libertyguide/hsr/hsr.php?id=41&print=1" \l "_ftn23) If we do not tend to what is good for nature, we will not be tending to what is good for people either. As Gary Varner recently put it, on purely anthropocentric grounds we have reason to think biocentrically.[[23]](http://www.theihs.org/libertyguide/hsr/hsr.php?id=41&print=1" \l "_ftn24) I completely agree. What I wish to add is that the converse is also true: on purely biocentric grounds, we have reason to think anthropocentrically. We need to be human-centered to be properly nature-centered, for if we do not tend to what is good for people, we will not be tending to what is good for nature either. From a biocentric perspective, preservationists sometimes are not anthropocentric enough. They sometimes advocate policies and regulations with no concern for values and priorities that differ from their own. Even from a purely biocentric perspective, such slights are illegitimate. Policy makers who ignore human values and human priorities that differ from their own will, in effect, be committed to mismanaging the ecology of which those ignored values and priorities are an integral part.

#### Either humans are morally equal to animals in which exploiting other animals is justified or humans are morally superior - either way domination is legitimate.

Neil Schulman, 1995, “The Illogic of Animal Rights”, http://www.pulpless.com/jneil/aniright.html

#### If human beings are no different from other animals, then like all other animals it is our nature to kill any other animal which serves the purposes of our survival and well-being, for that is the way of all nature. Therefore, aside from economic concerns such as making sure we don't kill so quickly that we destroy a species and deprive our descendants of prey, human animals can kill members of other animal species for their usefulness to us. It is only if we are not just another animal -- if our nature is distinctly superior to other animals -- that we become subject to ethics at all -- and then those ethics must take into account our nature as masters of the lower animals. We may seek a balance of nature; but "balance" is a concept that only a species as intelligent as humankind could even contemplate. We may choose to temper the purposes to which we put lower animals with empathy and wisdom; but by virtue of our superior nature, we decide ... and if those decisions include the consumption of animals for human utilitarian or recreational purposes, then the limits on the uses we put the lower beasts are ones we set according to our individual human consciences. "Animal rights" do not exist in either case.

#### The alternative destroys the concept of rights and directly leads to genocide.

David R. Schmahmann & Lori J. Polacheck, Spring 1995, a partner in the firm of Nutter, McLennan & Fish, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review,

\*\*\*gender modified\*\*\*

#### In the end, however, it is the aggregate of these characteristics that does render humans fundamentally, importantly, and unbridgeably different from animals, even though it is also beyond question that in individual instances -- for example, in the case of vegetative individuals -- some animals may indeed have higher cognitive skills than some humans. To argue on that basis alone, however, that human institutions are morally flawed because they rest on assumptions regarding the aggregate of human abilities, needs, and actions is to deny such institutions the capacity to draw any distinctions at all. Consider the consequences of a theory which does not distinguish between animal life and human life for purposes of identifying and enforcing legal rights. Every individual member of every species would have recognized claims against human beings and the state, and perhaps other animals as well. As the concept of rights expanded to include the "claims" of all living creatures, the concept would lose much of its force, and human rights would suffer as a consequence. Long before Singer wrote Animal Liberation, one philosopher wrote: If it is once observed that there is no difference in principle between the case of dogs, cats, or horses, or stags, foxes, and hares, and that of tsetse-flies or tapeworms or the bacteria in our own blood-stream, the conclusion likely to be drawn is that there is so much wrong that we cannot help doing to the brute creation that it is best not to trouble ourselves about it any more at all. The ultimate sufferers are likely to be our fellow [humans] because the final conclusion is likely to be, not that we ought to treat the [\*753] brutes like human beings, but that there is no good reason why we should not treat human beings like brutes. Extension of this principle leads straight to Belsen and Buchenwald, Dachau and Auschwitz, where the German and the Jew or Pole only took the place of the human being and the Colorado beetle. 26

#### Their ethic is biologically impossible.

Geordie Duckler, 2008, PhD in Biology, JD from Northwestern, ARTICLE: TWO MAJOR FLAWS OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 14 Animal L. 179, Lexis Nexis

#### Those of us at the heart of the animal law movement envision a world in which the lives and interests of all sentient beings are respected within the legal system, where companion animals have good, loving homes for a lifetime, where wild animals can live out their natural lives according to their instincts in an environment that supports their needs - a world in which animals are not exploited, terrorized, tortured or controlled to serve frivolous or greedy human purposes. This vision guides in working toward a far more just and truly humane society. [n83](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.997959.0518058672&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220848443484&returnToKey=20_T4504110919&parent=docview#n83)  A workable definition of "sentience" or "sentient beings" notwithstanding, one would have to ignore the last hundred and fifty years of accumulated rigorous scientific study of how evolution by natural selection actually works in the natural world to sincerely make such a  [\*197]  plea. [n84](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.997959.0518058672&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220848443484&returnToKey=20_T4504110919&parent=docview#n84) A world "in which animals are not exploited, terrorized, tortured or controlled to serve frivolous or greedy human purposes" [n85](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.997959.0518058672&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220848443484&returnToKey=20_T4504110919&parent=docview#n85) is an unobtainable, inherently biologically impossible world. Moreover, the world of nature to which Tischler fervently hopes to return animals already is a world in which animals are "exploited, terrorized, tortured or controlled" [n86](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.997959.0518058672&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220848443484&returnToKey=20_T4504110919&parent=docview#n86) to serve the frivolous or greedy purposes of other animals, including conspecifics and kin.

#### Abdicating an anthropocentric view sacrifices lives from lack of scientific progress – must use consequentialism when evaluating animal rights.

Carl Cohen, 1986, Professor at the University of Michigan, [http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/cohen.pdf](http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200%2CSpr07/cohen.pdf)

#### Humans owe to other humans a degree of moral regard that cannot be owed to animals. Some humans take on the obligation to support and heal others, both humans and animals, as a principal duty in their lives; the fulfillment of that duty may require the sacrifice of many animals. If biomedical investigators abandon the effective pursuit of their professional objectives because they are convinced that they may not do to animals what the service of humans requires, they will fail, objectively, to do their duty. Refusing to recognize the moral differences among species is a sure path to calamity. (The largest animal rights group in the country is People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals; its co- director, Ingrid Newkirk, calls research using animal subjects "fascism" and "supremacism." "Animal liberationists do not separate out the human animal," she says, "so there is no rational basis for saying that a human being has special rights. A rat is a pig is a dog is a boy. They're all mammals.") Those who claim to base their objection to the use of animals in biomedical research on their reckoning of the net pleasures and pains produced make a second error, equally grave. Even if it were true--as it is surely not--that the pains of all animate beings must be counted equally, a cogent utilitarian calculation requires that we weigh all the consequences of the use, and of the nonuse, of animals in laboratory research. Critics relying (however mistakenly) on animal rights may claim to ignore the beneficial results of such research, rights being trump cards to which interest and advantage must give way. But an argument that is explicitly framed in terms of interest and benefit for all over the long run must attend also to the disadvantageous consequences of not using animals in research, and to all the achievements attained and attainable only through their use.

The alt never says reject in the card – justifies artificial competition and things like the wipeout counterplan – vi for fairness and education.

#### The alternative fails – anthropocentrism is inevitable.

Eugene Hargrove, 2003, “Weak Antrhopecentric Intrinsic Value,” Blackwell Synergy

#### I have used the term weak anthropocentrism, rather than simply anthropocentrism, in the title of this paper to help call attention to the fact that not all anthropocentric valuing is instrumental. Wihtout the addition of the word weak, no doubt many nonanthropocentrists would probably conclude that the title contained a typographical error or was a contradiction in terms: “instrumentali intrinsic value.” While I do no think that labels are important, it is useful to call the view I represent weak anthropocentrism at least until it becomes generally recognized that anthropocentrism does no imply instrumentalism. I do not think that it is possible for humans to avoid being anthropocentric given that whatever we humans value will always be form a human (or anthropocentric) point of view, even when we try to imagine what is might be like to have the point of view of (or be) a bat, a tree, or a mountain, in my view, we are still looking at the world anthropocentrically – the way a human imagines that a nonhuman might look at the world.

## 2AC CP

### Conditionality is bad and it’s a voting issue:

1. Moving Target—the neg doesn’t have to defend a concrete policy option. This allows the neg to simply drop arguments, teaching fallacious reasoning and killing any hope of in depth debate on a single issue

#### Time Skew—

* 1. We have to make double the arguments against the status quo AND the counteprlan destroying any hope of adequate coverage
	2. They could come up and kick the counterplan, wasting all the time I spend reading answers in the 2AC
1. Reciprocity—confining the negative to one world is necessary to prevent digression into obscene amounts of advocacies—justifies aff conditionality which is uniquely worse
2. Kills Game Values – leads to irresponsible argumentation. They will simply kick what we are winning. Kills fairness because the Aff has to stick to it’s plan even if the neg is winning all its offense so the neg should have to stick to theirs
3. Counter-interpretation—the negative should be forced to defend dispositionality

Dispositionality solves all their offense—this puts them in a unique double-bind, either:
	1. The counterplan is predictable—there will be plenty of literature on the counterplan to the point where even an amazing text would still not require permutations and straight turns would check abuse
	2. The counterplan is unpredictable—this is uniquely bad for debate because it forces permutations which are the only means by which the affirmative can get back up to ground zero and proves the abuse

### Voting issue for fairness and education

### Exclusionary PICs are illegitimate and a voting issue-

1. Infinitely regressive- allows the negative to exclude a penny and any risk of a crappy disad and we lose
2. Steals aff ground – the plan is the focus of the debate; exclusion PICs moot the entirety of the 1AC by retaining all the good parts and excluding minute details, making it impossible for us to use the 1AC as leverage- this is equivalent to intellectual plagiariasm
3. Encourages vague plan writing – unpredictable affs will always be extremely broad in order to capture the perm, forcing unlimiting.
4. Reciprocity- if the neg can sever out of part of the plan to run a counterplan- then the aff should be allowed to do the same with a permutation- this justifies the permutation- perm: do the counterplan
5. Kills clash and education- we no longer can debate about the substance of the plan or weigh it at all and are instead forced to assess the risk of a crappy disad
6. Unpredictable- there is no way the affirmative can predict every single counterplan that excludes a certain aspect of the plan- the exclusion isn’t even based on the plan text but rather a status quo situation
7. No right to these abusive PICs- the neg shouldn’t be allowed to defend the entirety of the affirmative except for one minute aspect- they can still run their disads against the case with agent counterplans- this solves all of their offense- they have the same amount of counterplan ground and get the in-depth debates through the disads
8. It’s a voter to ensure competitive equity and education

#### Perm do both

#### Perm do the CP

#### Language focus creates a prison house- prevents solutions to problems

McNally**,** 1997 (David McNally, professor of political science at York University, “in defense of history” p. 26-7)

We are witnessing today a new idealism, infecting large sections of the intellectual left, which has turned language not merely into an independent realm, but into an all pervasive realm, a sphere so omnipresent, so dominant, as virtually to extinguish human agency. Everything is discourse, you see and discourse is everything. Because human beings are linguistic creatures, because the world in which we act is a world we know and describe through language, it allegedly follows that there is nothing outsides language. Our language, or “discourse”, or “text” – the jargon varies but not the message – define and limits what we know, what we can imagine, what we can do. There is a political theory here too. Oppression is said to be rooted ultimately in the way in the way in which we are and others are defined linguistically, the way in which we are positioned by words in relation to other words, or by codes which are said to be “structured like a language.” Our very being, our identities and “subjectivites,” are constituted through language. As one trendy literary theorist puts it in David Lodge’s novel Nice Work, it is not merely that you are what you speak; no, according to the new idealism, “you are what speaks of you,” Language is thus the final “prison-house”. Our confinement there is beyond resistance: It is impossible to escape from that which makes us what we are. This new idealism corresponds to a profound collapse of political horizons. It is the pseudoradicalism of a period of retreat for the left, a verbal radicalism of the world without deed, or, rather, of the word as deed. In response to actual structures and practices of oppression and exploitation, it offers the rhetorical gesture, the ironic turn of phrase. It comes as little surprise, then, when on of the chief philosophers of the new idealism, Jacques Derrida, tells us that he “would hesitate to use such terms as ‘liberation’” Imprisoned within language, we may play with words; but we can never hope to liberate ourselves from immutable structures of oppression rooted in language itself. The new idealism and the politics it entails are not simply harmless curiosities; they are an abdication of political responsibility, especially at a time of ferocious capitalist restructuring, of widening gaps between rich and poor, of ruling class offensives against social programs. They are also an obstacle to the rebuilding of mass movements of protest and resistance.

#### Embrace a plurality of English-es rather than an insistence on the innate superiority of one linguistic strategy – the perm is the best option

David E. **Kirkland 10**, English prof at NYU, “English(es) in Urban Contexts: Politics, Pluralism, and Possibilities”, English Education, V42, N3

By definition, language once uttered begins to break apart. Its many pieces assemble a history from their various shards, which “from top to bottom . . . represent[s] the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past, between differing epochs of the past, between different socio-ideological groups in the present, between tendencies, schools, circles and so forth” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 291). These languages— Englishes, in this case—which have been traded on through various public and private transactions, have constructed a world of their own, governed by what Bakhtin calls “new socially typifying ‘languages’” (p. 291). These languages, Englishes housed in American cities and throughout the globe, have coalesced into what Nero (2005) sees as the lingua franca of the modern era. Hence, Englishes, as opposed to English, are relevant to the twenty-first century conversations of English education. This does not mean that the “old” English education is irrelevant. Conversations about English traditions continue as part of new English education (Kirkland, 2008). However, promoting linguistic pluralism means fully appreciating the hybrid and textured nature in which English is practiced and performed by inner-city youth (see Paris, 2009) as elemental to new English education. The exclusive foci on the study of high dialects can bastardize a language’s fluidity, marginalize its speakers who embody pluralistic identities through their troubled tongues (Ahmad, 2007), and presuppose the process of learning to teach by restricting students’ right to their own language (Kinloch, 2005; Kirkland & Jackson, 2009). Placed in this context, language as a monolithic construct loses importance in the pluralized/ hybridized linguistic lives of urban youth, and the processes of English education lose emphasis in postmodern classrooms. Indeed, we in English education should be concerned, for according to Bakhtin (1981), “It might even seem that the very word ‘language’ loses all meaning in this process—for apparently there is no single plane on which all these ‘languages’ might be juxtaposed to one another” (p. 291). In this way, Canagarajah (2003) expands the definition of English due, in part, to political concerns that grow out of such “language rights issues [that] are still vexing and controversial” (p. ix). For Canagarajah, “the scope of language issues [in the United States] emphasizes the ongoing presence of multiple versions of English in all our classrooms, linked to real issues of personal and ethnic identity” (p. ix). From this perspective, to understand English teaching today, one must recognize the pliant forces that tug at it and destabilize language standardization, generating an internal variability that locks diversity into any given language system (Fecho, 2003). Students are exposed to these forces whenever language(s) become the subject of classroom study. In his reflective study of critical language awareness practices, Fecho (2003) explains how his students were suspicious of language and the monolingual hegemony of “mainstream codes” in their city classroom: Robert grasped that many codes were within his reach, but also grasped that these codes brought advantages and costs. He came to realize that it was difficult at best to operate and sound natural in a language code with which one had little practice using or had mixed feeling about acquiring. . . . What I learned was that, for these students and others like them, it was a matter of if they were able to speak and write in the mainstream codes . . . but was more a matter of figuring out why they would feel disposed to do so. (p. 67; emphasis in original) Fecho’s student’s suspicion of a mainstream code is not surprising. For these students, appropriating this code was not a politically innocent act. Rather, it “brought advantages and costs.” That is, the appropriation of any code is about the politics of language, the competition among codes. It is also about relevance in a world that requires certain ways of speaking, certain sounds and social postures pronounced in various sociopolitical accents. A pluralistic view of English, then, is key for highlighting the sociopolitical tensions reflected in students’ worlds. Englishes (as opposed to English) seem to better capture the complexities of students’ lives for conceptualizing their worlds in words and “specific world views, each characterized by its own objects, meanings and values” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 292). As languages hybridize, new Englishes emerge for students “to make sense of the world around [them] . . . [for] deepening their views on race and its impact in society” (Fecho, 2003, p. 67). Calls for extending the conversation in English education are far from new. It has been four years since Swenson, Young, McGrail, Rozema, and Whitin (2006) called for an evolved conception of English education due to “newer technologies [that] are reshaping our lives and communities” (p. 353), definitions of texts, and conceptions of reading and writing, of readers and writers. For Swenson et al., these “new literacies” invite English educators to rethink the evolving contexts of our work. Boyd and colleagues (2006) also express this need, arguing, “Never in the history of education in the United States has there been a more urgent need for educators to join forces to create literacy classrooms that meet the needs of linguistically and culturally diverse learners” (p. 329). The new English education is “crossing cultural boundaries” (p. 335), recognizing “student’s funds of knowledge” (p. 337) by fostering for students “varied educational experiences” (p. 340) through “socially responsive and responsible teaching” (p. 338). All students should be “taught mainstream power codes/discourses and become critical users of language while also having their home and street codes honored” (p. 344). While I find merit in Boyd et al.’s (2006) call for rethinking English education for the twenty-first century, I tend to agree with Smitherman and Villanueva (2003), who contend that paying tribute to linguistic diversity isn’t enough. English by definition is diverse, pluralistic, and always changing. And the dynamism of English (plural) can be witnessed from New York (Fisher, 2007) to Los Angeles (Alim, 2006), from the United States (Gee, 1996) to South Africa (Ball, 2009; Sailors, Hoffman, & Matthee, 2007; Smitherman, 2006) to Australia (Luke, 2004). In each context, brave new voices are emerging. These voices are evident among urban youth in the United States, who are bending vowels and verbs, shattering stale syntaxes and sounds, and embodying the vernacular Englishes that constitute new century spaces—online social communities (Kirkland, in press), multiethnic communities (Paris, 2009), and global communities (Nero, 2005). The transnational dispersion of Englishes into the urban, digital, global, and youth mainstreams has not taken place without complexities. These complexities usually appear in heated debates over what constitutes English and increasingly are highlighted in urban education language debates (Beykont, 2002; Kinloch, 2005; Kirkland & Jackson, 2009; Smitherman, 1999), where English can never be accurately described as stable, fixed, or singular. The pluralistic, dynamic, hybrid, and fluid nature of English swells, shifts, and is ultimately transformed in urban contexts, which are themselves complicated by linguistic legacies of survival and oppression.

#### Backlash – Censoring certain words transforms politics into a fight over language rather than the institutions that generate true violence.

Brown 1 [Wendy Brown, professor at UC-Berkeley, 2001 Politics Out of History, p. 35-36]JFS

 **“Speech codes kill critique**,” Henry Louis Gates remarked in a 1993 essay on hate speech. Although Gates was referring to what happens when hate speech regulations, and the debates about them, usurp the discursive space in which one might have offered a substantive *political* response to bigoted epithets, his point also applies to prohibitions against questioning from within selected political practices or institutions. But **turning political questions into moralistic ones—as speech codes of any sort do—not only prohibits certain questions** and mandates certain genuflections, **it also expresses a profound hostility toward political life insofar as it seeks to preempt argument with a legislative and enforced truth.** And the realization of that patently undemocratic desire can only and always convert emancipatory aspirations into reactionary ones. Indeed, it insulates those aspirations from questioning at the very moment that Weberian forces of rationality and bureaucratization are quite likely to be domesticating them from another direction. Here we greet a persistent political paradox: **the moralistic defense of critical practices**, or of any besieged identity, **weakens what it strives to fortify precisely by sequestering those practices from the kind of critical inquiry out of which they were born.** Thus Gates might have said, “Speech codes, born of social critique, kill critique.” And, we might add, contemporary identity-based institutions, born of social critique, invariably become conservative as they are forced to essentialize the identity and naturalize the boundaries of what they once grasped as a contingent effect of historically specific social powers. But **moralistic reproaches to certain kinds of speech or argument kill critique** not only by displacing it with arguments about abstract rights versus identity-bound injuries, but also **by configuring political injustice and political righteousness as a problem of remarks, attitude, and speech rather than as a matter of historical, political-economic, and cultural formations of power. Rather than offering analytically substantive accounts of the forces of injustice or injury, they condemn the manifestation of these forces in particular remarks or events. There is, in the inclination to ban** (formally or informally) **certain utterances and to mandate others, a politics of rhetoric and gesture that itself symptomizes despair over effecting change at more significant levels. As vast quantities of left and liberal attention go to determining what** socially marked **individuals say, how they are represented**, and how many of each kind appear in certain institutions or are appointed to various commissions, **the sources that generate racism, poverty, violence against women, and other elements of social injustice remain relatively unarticulated and unaddressed.** We are lost as how to address those sources; but rather than examine this loss or disorientation, rather than bear the humiliation of our impotence, **we posture as if we were still fighting the big and good fight in our clamor over words and names. Don’t mourn, moralize**

#### Thus, permutation – acknowledge oppressiveness of wording but don’t vote for it – Language is reversible – The introduction of injurious language simultaneously introduces the prospect of contestation – Their erasure avoids the prospect of contestation

Butler 97 (Judith, **Excitable Speech**, UC-Berkeley, p. 2)

One is not simply fixed by the name that one is called. **In being called an injurious name, one is derogated** and demeaned. **But the name holds** out **another possibility as well: by being called a name, one is also**, paradaoxically, **given a** certain **possibility for social existence**, initiated into a temporal life of language that exceeds the prior purposes that animate that call. Thus **the injurious address may appear to** fix or **paralyze** the one it hails, **but it** **may** also **produce an** unexpected and **enabling response**. If to be addressed is to be interpellated, then **the offensive call runs the risk of inaugurating a subject** in speech who comes **to** use language to **counter the offensive call**. When the address is injurious, it works its force upon the one in injures.

#### Giving meaning to language can’t be done in a situation where one person defines words on behalf of others – environments where individuals can concede new ideas about language is key to education – liberation is only possible with a consistent effort, not a strategic discourse

Freire in ‘70

(Paulo, Brazilian educator and influential theorist of critical pedagogy*, Pedagogy of the Opressed*, 1970)

**If it is in speaking their word that people, by naming the world, transform it dialogue imposes itself as the +way by which they achieve significance as human beings**. **Dialogue is thus an existential necessity. And since dialogue is the encounter in which the united reflection and action of the dialoguers are addressed to the world which is to be transformed and humanized, this** **dialogue cannot be reduced to the act of one person’s “depositing” ideas in another**; **nor can it become a simple exchange of ideas to be “consumed” by the discussants**. **Nor yet** **is it a hostile, polemical argument between those who are committed neither to the naming of the world, nor to the search for truth, but rather to the imposition of their own truth**. Because dialogue is an encounter among women and men who name the world, **it must not be a situation where some name on behalf of others. It is an act of creation; it must not serve as a crafty instrument for the domination of one person by another**. The domination implicit in dialogue is that of the world by the dialoguers; it is conquest of the world for the liberation of humankind.**¶** Dialogue cannot exist, however, in the absence of a profound love for the world and for people. The naming of the world, which is an act of creation and re-creation, is not possible if it is not infused with love.[[4]](http://www.marxists.org/subject/education/freire/pedagogy/ch03.htm#n4)Love is at the same time the foundation of dialogue and dialogue itself. It is thus necessarily the task of responsible Subjects and cannot exist in a relation of domination. Domination reveals the pathology of **love: sadism in the dominator and masochism in the dominated. Because love is an act of courage, not of fear, love is commitment to others. No matter where the oppressed are found, the act of love is commitment to their cause — the cause of liberation. And this commitment, because it is loving, is dialogical. As an act of bravery, love cannot be sentimental; as an act of freedom, it must not serve as a pretext for manipulation. It must generate other acts of freedom; otherwise, it is not love. Only by abolishing the situation of oppression is it possible to restore the lovewhich that situation made impossible.** If I do not love the world — if I do not love life — if I do not love people — I cannot enter into dialogue.¶ On the other hand, **dialogue cannot exist without humility. The naming of the world, through which people constantly re-create that world, cannot be an act of arrogance.** Dialogue, as the encounter of those addressed to the common task of learning and acting, is broken if the parties (or one of them) lack humility. How can I dialogue if I always project ignorance onto others and never perceive my own? How can I dialogue if I regard myself as a case apart from others — mere “its” in whom I cannot recognize other “I"s? How can I dialogue if I consider myself a member of the in-group of pure men, the owners of truth and knowledge, for whom all non-members are “these people” or “the great unwashed"? How can I dialogue if I start from the premise that naming the world is the task of an elite and that the presence of the people in history is a sign of deterioration, thus to be avoided? How can I dialogue if I am closed to — and even offended by — the contribution of others? How can I dialogue if I am afraid of being displaced, the mere possibility causing me torment and weakness? Self-sufficiency is incompatible with dialogue. Men and women who lack humility (or have lost it) cannot come to the people, cannot be their partners in naming the world**. Someone who cannot acknowledge himself to be as mortal as everyone else still has a long way to go before he can reach the point of encounter. At the point of encounter there are neither utter ignoramuses nor perfect sages; there are only people who are attempting, together, to learn more than they now know**.

## 2AC Risk K

#### That schol inev-perm do both is part of solution

#### Exceptional catalysts control direction of systemic risks—our internal links are the sufficient provocations for underlying conditions—ignorance commits to the impacts

Lebow 2k (Contingency, Catalysts, and International System Change, Richard Ned Lebow director of the Mershon Center and professor of political science, history, and psy- chology at Ohio State University Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 115, No. 4 (Winter, 2000-2001), pp. 591-616 Published by: The Academy of Political Science Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2657611>.)

Wars, revolutions, and depressions change the world and the way in which we think about it. World War I was a seminal event in both respects. It ushered in a profound transformation of the international system, and is de- scribed by many historians as the crucible in which the twentieth century was shaped. It has also been a critical case for the generation and testing of theories about conflict and international relations more generally. Many historians contend that World War I-or something like it-would have been very hard, if not impossible, to avoid. The distinguished British histo- rian, F. H. Hinsley, insisted, "If the Sarajevo crisis had not precipitated a partic- ular great war, some other crisis would have precipitated a great war at no dis- tant date."1 Neorealists and power transition theorists make similar claims, albeit for different reasons.2 I do not doubt that many, perhaps most of the causes of war in 1914 that historians and political scientists have identified cre- ated a conflict-prone environment. But underlying causes, no matter how nu- merous or deep-seated, do not make an event inevitable. Their consequences may depend on fortuitous coincidences in timing and on the presence of cata- lysts that are independent of any of the underlying causes. World War I was overdetermined and highly contingent in both its underly- ing and immediate causes. Historians have proposed a variety of underlying causes for World War I, including social Darwinism, nationalism, the alliance structure, and shifts in the balance of power. I argue that what made Europe ripe for war was not the multitude of alleged causes, but rather the interactions among them. World War I is best understood as a nonlinear confluence of three largely independent chains of causation, which produced independent but more or less simultaneous gestalt shifts in Vienna and Berlin, and a slightly ear- lier one in Russia. Had the timing of the Austrian and German shifts been off by as little as two years, Austrian leaders would not have felt so intent on de- stroying Serbia, or German leaders would not have been so willing to encour- age them to do so. For this reason alone, World War I was overdetermined and highly contingent. Theoretical explanations for war take catalysts for granted. If the right un- derlying conditions are present, some incident will sooner or later set armies on the march in the way the twin assassinations in Sarajevo did in 1914. But Sarajevo was not just any provocation; it met a diverse set of political and psy- chological requirements that were essential for Austrian and German leaders to risk war. It is possible, but extremely unlikely, that some other provocation would have met these conditions or that some other combination of great pow- ers would have started a war for different reasons. In the absence of a catalyst, several more years of peace could have altered the strategic and domestic con- texts of the great powers and made war less likely. There was a two-year win- dow when the leaders of at least two great powers thought their national or dynastic interests were better served by war than peace. Social scientists often assume that major social and political developments are specific instances of strong or even weak regularities in social behavior. But these developments may be the result of accidental conjunctures. Conversely, events that seem highly likely may never happen. The concatenation of particular leaders with particular contexts, and of particular events with other events is always a matter of chance, never of necessity.3 My findings have important implications for the study of international sys- tem change, by which I mean a change in the polarity of the system or the rules by which it operates. They suggest that system transformations-and many other kinds of international events-are unpredictable because their underly- ing causes do nothing more than create the possibility of change. Actual change depends upon contingency, catalysts, and actors. Neither contingency nor cata- lysts have been analyzed systematically by social scientists, and I offer some thoughts about how this might be done. There is a large literature on actors, most of it based on the premise that they are instrumentally rational. A striking finding of the World War I case and of the two other system transformations of the twentieth century-World War II and the end of the cold war-is the extent to which the behavior that brought about these transformations was based on extreme miscalculations. Such behavior may not be the norm in every- day foreign policy decision making, but it may be characteristic of the decisions that unwittingly usher in system transformations. The first two stages of my inquiry make use of counterfactual thought ex- periments.4 Counterfactuals are past conditionals or, more colloquially, "what if" statements about the past. They alter some aspect of the past (doing away with a person or event, changing a critical decision or outcome, inserting an event or development that never happened, or making it take place sooner or later than it did) to set the stage for a "what might have been" argument. I use only "minimal rewrite" counterfactuals. They entail small, plausible changes in reality that do not violate our understanding of what was technologically, culturally, temporally, or otherwise possible.5 A world in which Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife returned alive from their 1914 visit to Sarajevo is an example. Gavrilo Princip's accomplice missed killing the royals in their procession to city hall. Princip was lamenting his failure when the touring car carrying Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie came to a stop to allow the cars at the head of the procession to back up because they had made a wrong turn. With only a minimal rewrite of history, the procession stays on the planned route, and the assassination is averted. Such a rewrite does not strain our under- standing of the world, because most twentieth-century royal processions follow their intended routes. The archduke's was an exception.

#### We solve the K without succumbing to their structural determinism—forward reasoning evaluates variable causal interactions to find relative value

Lebow 7 (Richard Ned Lebow, James O. Freedman Presidential Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Coercion, Cooperation, and Ethics in International relations, 2007, p. 145-6)

Scenarios make contingent claims rather than point predictions. They reinsert a sensible notion of contingency into theoretical arguments that would otherwise tend toward determinism. Scholars in international relations tend to privilege arguments that reach back into the past and parse out one or two causal variables that are then posited to be the major driving forces of past and future outcomes. The field also favors variables that are structural or otherwise parametric, thus downplaying the role of both agency and accident. Forward reasoning under­cuts structural determinism by raising the possibility and plausibility of multiple futures. Scenarios are impressionistic pictures that build on different combinations of causal variables that may also take on different values in different scenarios. Thus it is possible to construct scenarios without pre-existing firm proof of theoretical claims that meet strict positivist standards. The foundation for scenarios is made up of provisional assumptions and causal claims. These become the subject of revision and updating more than testing. A set of scenarios often contains com­peting or at least contrasting assumptions. It is less important where people start. than it is where they are through frequent revisions, and how they got there. A good scenario is an internally consistent hypothesis about how the future might unfold; it is a chain of logic that connects "drivers" to outcomes. Consider as an example one plausible scenario at the level of a "global future" where power continues to shift away from the state and toward international institutions, trans-national actors, and local communities. The state loses its monopoly on the provision of security and basic characteristics of the Westphalian system as we have known it are fundamentally altered. In this setting, key decisions about security, economics and culture will be made by nonstate actors. Security may become a commodity that can be bought like other commodities in the global marketplace. A detailed scenario about this transformation would specify the range of changes that are expected to occur and how they are connected to one another. It would identify what kinds of evidence might support the scenario as these or other processes unfold over the next decade, and what kind of evidence would count against the scenario or indicate a branching off point. Moreover, evidence that counts against one scenario, might count for another. Evaluations of evidence as events unfolded would then determine which scenario appeared to be playing out, or whether the same scenario had started to evolve in unanticipated directions. The same drivers could be at play in multiple scenarios, but how changes in technology, human agency, and transnational networks interact is less certain and these interactions can lead outcomes along very different trajectories. This method is simply a form of process tracing, or increasing the number of observable implications of an argument, in future rather than past time. Eventually, as in the heuristics of evolutionary biology, future history becomes data. But instead of thinking of data as something that can falsify any particular hypothesis, we need to think of it as something capable distinguishing or selecting the story that was from stories that might have been. Such storylines are not linear, but as contingent in a way our scenario methodology tries to capture. A central choice in developing scenarios is whether to begin with drivers—the "causal forces" or the plot line in the story—or the outcomes or resolution of the stories. There are several reasons to start with drivers. From the perspective of traditional social science, it is cleaner in principle to reason from cause to effect when possible. Pragmatically, scenario thinkers are more likely to generate results that contain surprises or challenging combinations of events when they begin from beliefs or ideas about fundamental causes, rather than from preconceived notions of the most likely outcome states. People who work on particular problems and have done so for a long time typically carry around in their heads a set of plausible outcomes, or "official futures," that they believe are likely and relevant to their concerns. One of the purposes of constructing scenarios is to encourage scholars and experts to think outside of these confines about plausible, different futures. In summary, scenario thinking is disciplined by beginning with the identification of the several factors (causes), which scholars believe are most important to the future of a political relationship. They can then distinguish between what is most certain and what is most uncertain. Uncertainty in this context can mean that scholars are uncertain about the 'value' of the variable, or about the causal impact of the variable, or both. The three or four most important, uncertain causes can then be identified, as well as a narrative explication of the **key uncertainties** at play and the nature of their possible interactions. These critical uncertainties become the basis of different plot lines. By assigning different "values" to these variables, and combining them in different ways, scholars can reason to a set of plausible end-states. These end-states should be plausible within existing conceptual frameworks, but, when possible, challenging to "official futures." Scholar-can then develop the narrative pathways that could generate the outcomes by moving from a highly abstract framework toward increasingly precise—and compelling—causal stories that specify assumptions, major drivers, limiting conditions, and implications. As part of these narratives, scholars must specify the trends that weave through their stories, and can be monitored as time passes. Rather than prediction, laying out such a scenario and its alternatives encourages students of international affairs to consider a range of drivers, to identify the critical uncertainties, to develop different plot lines by varying these uncertainties, and to develop indicators of different paths to monitor trends as they unfold. Just as counterfactual analysis is a useful tool for evaluating the strength of competing explanations and recognizing the contingency of outcomes that actually occurred, forward reasoning opens our analyses to the possibilities of alternative futures, but forces discipline in tracing likely paths created by important drivers in combination with significant uncertainties. Perhaps the most important contribution forward reasoning can make to international relations is to confront us repeatedly with surprises. Whatever theories or suppositions guide scenario generation, our expectations will be frequently, if not regularly, confounded given the power of agency and the open nature of all social systems. Discrepant outcomes can always be explained away or somehow made consistent with existing theories of international relations—as with realism and the end of the Cold War—by various conceptual sleights of hand. Forward reasoning actively seeks to rebut its own expectations, and considers discrepant information as valuable as confirming information. Such an approach, if it does nothing else, encourages openness and humility, both of which are currently in very short supply in our discipline.

#### Targeted policy solves

Suteanu 5 (Complexity, Science and the Public : The Geography of a New Interpretation Cristian Suteanu Department of Geography & Environmental Studies Program Saint Mary’s U. Theory Culture Society 2005 22: 113 http://tcs.sagepub.com/content/22/5/113)

Learning about Prediction and Control It is precisely the advancement in complexity, both in its conceptual framework and in its methodology, which provides powerful tools to cope with the ‘wild’ dynamics of complex systems (Sornette, 2000). And yet, here lies also the source of insights concerning limits in our capability to make predictions. The lesson of the Lyapunov exponent mentioned above (in the subsection, ‘“To Be Reproducible”: Admitting Uniqueness’) means that complex dynamic systems may pose information-related obstacles to interaction with them. Sensitive dependence on initial conditions and perturbations affects one’s capacity to predict their behaviour. The degree of predictability does not depend exclusively on technological limits, which means that it does not change to suit the rhythm of technological progress: in the case of chaotic systems, we have to multiply our technological effort many times over to reach only moderately enhanced results, and these enhancements weaken fast when we go further in time. This is not to say that signiﬁcant progress with respect to dynamic system prediction has not been made or will not be made in the future, nor does it suggest that there are limits to achievable progress. However, this problem points to profound sources of constraints regarding predictability. For the public, an inevitable implication is that science really has a problem: it will never be able to predict accurately the dynamic behaviour of chaotic systems. In fact, instead of an expected breakthrough in this domain, science has provided proof that its ‘failure’ has solid foundations. The feeling of vulnerability can only be enhanced thereby. If prediction is such a challenging problem, what can be expected in terms of control? The answer here is not quite so negative. Based on principles of complexity, the resourcefulness of scholars has led to methods of what is called ‘chaos control’ (Ott et al., 1990). The idea is that if the system is unstable, and you know when, where and how to act upon it, you can guide or control it, using very little energy to do so. Instead of a large amount of energy, you need information. Spectacular technological applications have already begun to emerge (Boccaletti et al., 2000).

#### Robust statistics validate our impacts – prefer them over their polemics

Owen 11 John M. Owen Professor of Politics at University of Virginia PhD from Harvard "DON’T DISCOUNT HEGEMONY" Feb 11 www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon. The same case can be made, with somewhat more difficulty, concerning the spread of democracy. Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditions—the chief one being the absence of a popular anti-American movement in the target state—but those conditions have become much more widespread following the collapse of communism. Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administration—the most anti-communist government America ever had—began to dump America’s old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. Today Islamists tend to be anti-American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries. But general U.S. material and moral support for liberal democracy remains strong.

#### Overemphasis on method destroys effectiveness of the discipline

Wendt**,** Handbook of IR, 2002 p. 68

It should be stressed that in advocating a pragmatic view we are not endorsing method-driven social science. Too much research in international relations chooses problems or things to be explained with a view to whether the analysis will provide support for one or another methodological ‘ism’. But the point of IR scholarship should be to answer questions about international politics that are of great normative concern, not to validate methods. Methods are means, not ends in themselves. As a matter of personal scholarly choice it may be reasonable to stick with one method and see how far it takes us. But since we do not know how far that is, if the goal of the discipline is insight into world politics then it makes little sense to rule out one or the other approach on a priori grounds. In that case a method indeed becomes a tacit ontology, which may lead to neglect of whatever problems it is poorly suited to address. Being conscious about these choices is why it is important to distinguish between the ontological, empirical and pragmatic levels of the rationalist-constructivist debate. We favor the pragmatic approach on heuristic grounds, but we certainly believe a conversation should continue on all three levels.

#### No root cause of war – decades of research votes aff

Cashman 2000 Greg Cashman (Professor of Political Science at Salisbury State University) 2000 “What Causes war?: An introduction to theories of international conflict” pg. 9

Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, while we have been using a single variable explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex, they are almost never explainable through a single factor. Decades of research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war. For instance, international relations theorist J. David Singer suggests that we ought to move away from the concept of “causality” since it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war; we should instead redirect our activities toward discovering “explanations”—a term that implies multiple causes of war, but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their occurrence.